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BECOMING A FIFTH BRANCH
William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson†
Observers of our federal republic have long acknowledged that a fourth
branch of government comprising administrative agencies has arisen to join
the original three set forth in the Constitution.  In this Article, we focus our
attention on the emergence of yet another branch comprising financial self-
regulatory organizations (SROs).  In the late eighteenth century, long before
the establishment of state and federal securities authorities, the financial in-
dustry created its own SROs.  These private institutions then coexisted with
the public authorities for much of the past century in a complementary array
of informal and formal policing mechanisms.  That equilibrium, however,
appears to be growing increasingly imbalanced as financial SROs such as
FINRA transform from “self-regulatory” into “quasi-governmental”
organizations.
We describe this change by examining how SROs have been losing their
independence, growing distant from their industry members, and accruing
rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers that more closely resemble
governmental agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.  We then consider the conflu-
ence of forces that might be driving this shift towards governmentalization,
including, among others, demographic changes in the style and size of retail
investments in the securities markets, the one-way ratchet effect of high-pub-
licity failures and scandals, and the public choice incentives of regulators
and the compliance industry.
This process by which these self-regulatory organizations shed their inde-
pendence for an increasingly governmental role is highly undesirable from an
array of normative viewpoints.  For those who are skeptical of governmental
regulation, deputizing private bodies to increase governmental involvement
is clearly problematic.  And for those who believe recent financial problems
warrant greater oversight, the elimination of an entire species of regulation
impoverishes our regulatory spectrum.  We therefore offer proposals for how to
forestall this process.
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Government [should] keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded,
well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be
used.
– SEC Chair William O. Douglas, describing his vision of
self-regulation immediately prior to joining the Supreme Court.1
Is FINRA becoming a “deputy SEC”?
– SEC Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher.2
1 WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed., 1940).
2 Daniel M. Gallagher, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Market 2012: Time for a
Fresh Look at Equity Market Structure and Self-Regulation, Speech to SIFMA’s 15th An-
nual Market Structure Conference (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2012/spch100412dmg.htm.
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INTRODUCTION
Observers of our federal republic have long argued that a fourth
branch of government, comprising administrative agencies born of
the New Deal, has arisen to join the original three established by the
Constitution.3  In this Article, we argue that another branch, compris-
ing financial self-regulatory organizations (SROs), is emerging due to
a confluence of forces, which we attempt to identify and describe.
The process by which such organizations exchange their indepen-
dence for an increasingly governmental role is an undesirable but
largely inexorable development.  We therefore offer some initial ideas
for how to forestall it.
Many historians trace the rise of the “fourth branch” to New Deal
legislation that created a variety of new administrative agencies.4  Con-
gress delegated its authority in broad strokes to allow specialists in
various fields, such as finance, aviation, and the environment, to fill in
the regulatory details based on practical experience and knowledge.5
Although staffed with experts, these administrative agencies are never-
theless one step removed from the markets and firms they regulate.
Additionally, due to the realities of governmental budgets and the dy-
namics of bureaucratic entities, many commentators argue that the
agencies have long been understaffed and outgunned.6  This imbal-
3 The origin of the “headless fourth branch” phrase was a 1937 report commissioned
by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., AD-
MINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 7, 36 (1937); see also
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487–89 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[Administra-
tive bodies] have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government, which has de-
ranged our three-branch legal theories . . . .”); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in
Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984)
(“Almost fifty years of experience has accustomed lawyers and judges to accepting the inde-
pendent regulatory commissions, in the metaphor, as a ‘headless fourth branch’ of
government.”).
4 See, e.g., ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM (1995); THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930–1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989); James T. Klop-
penberg, “Who’s Afraid of the Welfare State?”, 18 REVS. AM. HIST. 395 (1990) (reviewing THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, supra, and THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988)).
5 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 25–26 (1990).
6 See, e.g., Sarah N. Lynch, Headaches at the SEC’s Think Tank, REUTERS, May 3, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/03/us-sec-risk-idUSTRE7420XR20110503
(describing the early results from the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation,
which was designed to keep abreast of the latest innovations on Wall Street); see also Don-
ald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of
Uncertainty, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1596 (2006) [hereinafter Langevoort, The SEC as a
Lawmaker] (positing that the Commission’s structure and political pressures motivate
rulemaking); Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional
Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 531 (1990) [here-
inafter Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy] (arguing that the dominance of lawyers in
policymaking roles in the SEC leads to undesirable complexity of regulation); Cheryl Nich-
ols, Addressing Inept SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessons from Madoff, the Hedge Fund Industry, and
Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S. and Global Financial Systems, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
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ance is especially acute in the world of finance, where the pecuniary
stakes are so high for private parties that governmental agencies by
themselves have always seemed overwhelmed.  To give just one exam-
ple, nearly seventy years elapsed before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) established a division to keep abreast of the latest
Wall Street innovations: a law professor, not a financier, was assigned
to head it, assisted by just a handful of staff to keep up with the armies
of innovators deployed on Wall Street.7
In the area of finance, where this imbalance is particularly po-
tent, the fourth branch of government has operated for decades in
tandem with various purely private bodies that also regulate the behav-
ior of financial professionals.  These member-based regulatory entities
long preceded any government regulation of financial markets.8  Di-
rect legal regulation of financial markets is a product of the early
twentieth century: Kansas’s blue-sky law of 1911 was the first piece of
state legislation to regulate financial markets,9 and Congress passed
the federal securities laws between 1933 and 1940.10  Private regula-
tion, in contrast, is a product of the late eighteenth century.11  The
early stock exchanges in New York were formed privately as early as
1792 primarily as a means to impose a private, member-based type of
regulation upon the nascent financial industry.12  By creating a more
secure forum in which to trade securities, the industry—or at least the
members of the exchanges—aspired to improve their business by ex-
cluding unreliable, uncreditworthy, and unscrupulous brokers.
When federal law did arrive, it borrowed heavily from these pri-
vate regulatory agencies, officially christened “self-regulatory organiza-
tions.”13  During the New Deal era, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
637, 638, 661–68 (2011) (arguing that in the case of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, the
SEC’s enforcement efforts were “abysmally inept”).
7 For a description of the Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation, see
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces New Division of Risk, Strategy, and
Financial Innovation (Sept. 16, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-199.
htm.
8 See infra note 47 and accompanying text and Part II. R
9 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210.
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).
11 For a general history, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET
(3d ed.) (2003).
12 STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION 171–75 (1998).  For fur-
ther discussion of early American financial law, see generally BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS
AND STRANGERS (1987); Claire Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New
England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303 (2001).  These early efforts at regulation were based on British
practices going back even further. See BANNER, supra, at 171–72.
13 For stockbrokers, the SRO is now called FINRA, which is a combination of the
regulatory arms of the NYSE and NASD. See Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Statement at News Conference Announcing NYSE-NASD Regulatory Merger
(Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch112806cc.htm.
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both were given a significant role to continue their regulatory mission
in conjunction with administrative agencies.14  In 2005, the regulatory
arms of the NYSE and NASD were combined into a new SRO called
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).  According to
the leading history of the SEC, SROs “retain[ed] the initial responsi-
bility for preventing fraud or unfairness, both because [they] could
act swiftly and more subtly than a government bound by due process
standards and could avoid ‘the bureaucratic blight’ of a too intrusive
government police force.”15
For some of the past eight or so decades, these private police of-
ficers of our financial system have operated solely on the private side
of the government/private border.16  This is the seemingly sensible
approach to financial regulation: a rational government would recog-
nize the value in outsourcing lawmaking and enforcement to an ex-
pert entity with better information and strong incentives to enforce
the rules.  The net effect of this would be to lower the cost of regula-
tion, to regulate markets efficiently, and to improve social welfare, es-
pecially if the government can oversee the entity using Douglas’s
shotgun approach to ensure that self-regulation does not create a
cartel.
But the story we tell in this Article is one of change.  We describe
several mechanisms that appear to be driving the “self” out of finan-
cial SROs, rendering them ever more quasi-governmental in nature.
We hypothesize that the rational government would ideally like to
maintain the public/private distinction, but there are forces inexora-
bly driving the government and the various other players into a less
optimal equilibrium.  Moreover, this process of “governmentalization”
appears to be accelerating.  In one of the most recent instances, the
failure of commodities broker MF Global quickly prompted a report
from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which
called for reforms that would increase the direct governmental role of
derivatives SROs, such as MF Global’s SRO, the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange (CME).17  Whether they fully appreciate it or not, financial
SROs are transforming into a “fifth branch” of government.
14 See The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2012).  Accord-
ing to Paul Mahoney, the NASD was born out of a trade association of investment banks
founded in 1912.  Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 23–24 (2001).
15 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 158 (quoting William O. Douglas). R
16 See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2029 (2005) (proposing a conception of the administrative state that accounts for the
vast networks of private agreements that accompany public regulation).
17 See infra notes 180–96 and accompanying text. R
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In this Article, we explore the factors that may be contributing to
this increasing governmentalization of SROs.18  Indeed, the MF
Global case illustrates at least one such mechanism driving the in-
creasing puissance and governmentalization of SROs: lawmakers re-
spond to many SRO “failures” by awarding greater power to their
governmental regulator and threatening the dissolution of the SRO,
while largely ignoring SRO “successes.”  This one-way ratchet rein-
forces the idea that, for an SRO, self-preservation may demand more
aggression—that is, behaving more like the government—within its
jurisdiction, even when other prudential concerns may not warrant
such a reaction.
Proponents of heightened financial regulation may celebrate the
prospect of more powerful and governmental SROs, while those who
favor less governmental intrusion will lament it.  In this Article, we
argue that regardless of one’s disposition toward financial regulation,
the mismatch between SROs’ governmental powers and private unac-
countability is leading our financial regulatory system towards an un-
stable and unsustainable structure at a time when it most requires
strength and stability.
If FINRA, CME, and other financial SROs do wield greater au-
thority than their members anticipate or believe lawful, legal chal-
lenges may arise under theories of due process and the Appointments
Clause, as presaged in the Supreme Court’s recent decision regarding
the constitutionality of the newly created SRO for the accounting in-
dustry, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).19
More problematically, however, the financial firms that are members
18 For other academic discussions of financial SROs, see generally Roberta S. Karmel,
Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151 (2008); Saule T. Omarova, Rethinking the Future of Self-Regulation
in the Financial Industry, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 665 (2010); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as
Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011)
[hereinafter Omarova, Wall Street].
19 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3148
(2010) (“[T]he parties agree that the Board is ‘part of the Government’ for constitutional
purposes . . . .”); see also Joseph McLaughlin, Is FINRA Constitutional?, 12 ENGAGE 111,
111–12 (2011) (discussing PCAOB’s operation as a member-driven SRO in contrast to the
fact that “the Board is a Government-created, Government-appointed entity, with expan-
sive powers to govern an entire industry” (citing Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3147));
Victoria F. Nourse & John P. Figura, Toward a Representational Theory of the Executive, 91 B.U.
L. REV. 273, 300–02 (2011) (reviewing STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE (2008)) (arguing that the two-tiered insulation of the PCAOB was
problematic because it undermined representational government); Richard H. Pildes, Free
Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Gov-
ernment Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 11–14 (2010)
(considering Free Enterprise Fund a “boundary-enforcing decision” limiting the process and
form of congressional insulation of agencies); Neomi Rao, A Modest Proposal: Abolishing
Agency Independence in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2541, 2547–49,
2567–69 (2011) (analyzing challenges of the PCAOB under the Appointments Clause).
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of SROs may begin to withdraw, either in spirit or in fact, from those
organizations, depriving our regulatory apparatus of vital expertise in
the oversight of complex financial transactions.20
In Part II of this Article, we examine the scope, rationale, and
history of financial self-regulation.  In Part III, we attempt to under-
stand the mechanisms that are driving the increasing governmental-
ization of SROs.  In Part IV, we consider the implications of these
changes for our financial regulatory system.  In Part V, we consider
alternatives to the quasi-governmental outcome by considering other
models for cooperation between industry and regulators, such as the
use of greater numbers of—and thus increased competition be-
tween—SROs.
I
THE SELF-REGULATION OF FINANCE
In this Part, we examine the scope, rationale, and history of finan-
cial self-regulation in this country.  Our goal is not to provide a com-
prehensive historical account but rather to focus on the way in which
self-regulation fits into the overall scheme of financial regulation and
to observe its significant changes over time.
A. The Private Character of Law
The promulgation and enforcement of law is, of course, a core
function of government.21  But it is one shared widely by private ac-
tors.  Government and governance are not the same thing, and non-
governmental regulations—what is commonly known as private law—
exercise substantial regulation of behavior.22  If “law” is simply the set
of rules that regulate the actions of a community, then law is made by
families, by firms, by universities, by private clubs, and by countless
other nongovernmental authorities.23  Entities and organizations of
all sizes establish and enforce their own disciplinary codes, often
through their own legislative, executive, and judicial efforts.24  Private
clubs, for instance, write rules, conduct investigations, and discipline
20 As described infra at notes 195–96, trust is an important element of efficient and R
low-cost regulation, and self-regulation is thought to be superior to adversarial government
regulation on this score.  For a more general treatment on the importance of trust in social
foundations, see generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST (1995).
21 See M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1127, 1143–44 (2000).
22 See NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW 223 (2007).
23 There is a long literature on what exactly is meant by “law.” See, e.g., H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).  We do not want to enter this debate, but rather are using
the term “law” loosely in the way we define it.
24 See generally Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral
Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND LEGITIMACY 264
(Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001) (discussing  global nongovernmental organizations).
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members through fines or expulsion after adjudicating cases.  Indeed,
this comparatively informal exercise of rulemaking and enforcement
is perhaps the predominant type in our society.
To be sure, all private law operates atop a foundation of formal,
governmental law.  Thus, should private regulation prove ineffectual
or violate broader societal interests embodied in formal rules, laws, or
constitutions, parties can appeal to the government.25  This layer of
informal ordering atop the formal system explains Douglas’s shot-
gun.26  Since government always enjoys the power to compel, all pri-
vate law presupposes government approval or, at the very least,
tolerance.  A discussion such as this leads quickly towards the realm of
natural rights and the nature of the state, but we need not proceed so
far.  For the purposes of exploring SROs, we need only acknowledge
that, as a practical matter, private law can serve as a compliment to or
a substitute for direct government regulation.  As we will see in this
Article, the array of private financial regulation reflects much of this
spectrum, beginning as it did as a substitute, developing as a vital com-
pliment, and then seemingly morphing into government regulation
itself.
B. Rationales for Financial Self-Regulation
The logic for the self-regulation of finance is based on the ra-
tional self-interest of market participants.  Industry professionals have
strong incentives to police their own, since many of the costs of misbe-
havior are born by all members of the profession while the benefits
inure only to the misbehaving few.  So long as the few do not control
the regulatory process, self-regulation could in theory work as well or
better than external regulation.
To illustrate this concept, imagine there are two types of brokers:
“good” brokers and “bad” brokers.  Further, assume customers cannot
readily distinguish between the two before choosing a broker.  This
supposition is reasonable inasmuch as brokers purvey an intangible
service, making it difficult to distinguish good from bad through mere
inspection.  In the absence of an ability to discriminate, rational cus-
tomers should discount the amount they will pay for brokerage ser-
25 Such review is embedded in current SRO models of regulation.  For example,
FINRA, acting through its Division of Enforcement, is responsible for bringing initial disci-
plinary actions against brokers.  FINRA “hearing officers” act as judges.  Decisions of hear-
ing panels may be appealed to a fourteen-member “court”—the National Adjudicatory
Council (NAC)—which comprises seven industry representatives (elected by members)
and seven nonindustry members (appointed by FINRA).  (Disclosure: Professor Hender-
son is currently a nonindustry member of the NAC.)  Decisions of the NAC may be ap-
pealed to the SEC and from there to the circuit courts of appeals and ultimately the
Supreme Court.
26 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. R
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vices because of the possibility of choosing a bad broker and thereby
being cheated.27
For instance, consider customers who would pay $10 for the ser-
vices of a good broker, knowing they will not be cheated, but only $5
for the advice of a bad broker, who might cheat them.  If customers
cannot distinguish between the two types of brokers, they should only
pay $7.50 for the advice of an average broker, assuming they think
there are an equal number of good and bad brokers.  If good brokers
cannot credibly signal their quality, they will be unable to charge the
full value of their services, and therefore good brokers are likely to
exit the market, to reduce the quality of their service, or to cheat.  As
such, the overall quality of brokers is inclined to drop.  This is the
familiar “lemons problem.”28  In this hypothetical, good brokers are
effectively subsidizing bad brokers.  Good brokers therefore possess
strong incentives to identify bad brokers or to remove them from the
industry, since doing so will allow good brokers to charge more for
their services (assuming, of course, that the all-in costs of this over-
sight are fewer than lost profits).  Industry self-regulation is an organic
part of a successful brokerage industry, and government is not obvi-
ously necessary to deliver it.
The logic of self-regulation does not apply in every regulatory sit-
uation.  In some other industries, self-regulation may not be very ef-
fective.  Consider, for instance, environmental pollution.  Pollution
may be profit maximizing for firms in the absence of regulation be-
cause costs (such as damage to the air, vegetation, or water) are im-
posed on others.  If no mechanism exists to force an Illinois factory to
pay for damage that its emissions cause to apple trees in upstate New
York, the Illinois factory is likely to emit more than the socially opti-
mal level.29  The farmers, their customers, or taxpayers will in turn pay
for some of the benefits that inure to factory’s customers.  Only when
costs are internalized to the production function, and therefore
priced by the market, are production and consumption likely to be
optimized.
27 When investors cannot distinguish between good and bad firms, they pay too little
for good investments and too much for bad securities.  Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer
Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2179
(2010) (quoting Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices,
41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1010 (1992) (“[C]ompanies whose stock is overvalued may raise too
much equity and overinvest.  On the other hand, companies whose stock is undervalued
may find it costly or impracticable to obtain sufficient capital from alternative sources, and
thus underinvest.”)).
28 George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488 (1970).
29 Cf. Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public Benefit,
90 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 18 (2012).
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Brokerage is amenable to self-regulation because the harm
caused by bad brokers (that is, ones taking too little care or engaging
in too much deleterious activity) is primarily borne by the individuals
who are in a contractual relationship with the broker.  When the bro-
ker cheats, the customer loses.30  In contrast, when a factory pollutes,
its customers gain.  This reversed outcome occurs because the costs of
the factory’s products are lower than they otherwise would be because
some of those costs of production are borne by others.  Polluters
therefore do not have strong incentives to police other polluters, and
thus self-regulation may be less effective in contexts such as environ-
mental regulation.31
Yet empowering “good” brokers to police “bad” brokers risks giv-
ing those good brokers the ability to reduce competition and to raise
their own profits.  For example, there is the possibility that relatively
larger or more well-established firms might exert disproportionate in-
fluence on the SRO and manipulate the organization into imposing
costs on relatively smaller or less established firms.  In such a way, self-
regulation might also give rise to anticompetitive behavior.
As an example, suppose that compliance with rules carries both a
fixed and a variable cost.  A simple way to appreciate this dynamic is to
imagine that the only cost of compliance is personnel in a compliance
department.  If we make the modest assumption that the number of
compliance officers does not scale directly with the assets under a par-
ticular firm’s management, then smaller firms will find themselves at a
competitive disadvantage, all else being equal, due to their greater
compliance costs.32  Consider two firms: one with $100 in assets under
management and one with $1000 in assets under management.  If
each officer can oversee $250 in assets but there is a minimum of at
least one compliance officer, then the regulatory costs for the smaller
30 To be sure, there may be some risk, called “systemic risk,” that customers’ losses will
harm other customers, but for most brokerage deals, this harm, which we might call “finan-
cial pollution,” is slight.
31 There may still be some work for nongovernmental regulation, such as through
third-party attestation about compliance or voluntary environmental controls designed to
increase firm or industry reputation. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental
Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 148–50 (2013).  The short-lived Chicago Climate Ex-
change, where firms voluntarily agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, is an example
of this. See, e.g., Nathanial Gronewold, Chicago Climate Exchange Closes Nation’s First Cap-and-
Trade System but Keeps Eye to the Future, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
cwire/2011/01/03/03climatewire-chicago-climate-exchange-closes-but-keeps-ey-78598.
html?pagewanted=all.
32 A study conducted by the Securities Industry Association in 2006 found that even
though large firms spend a greater percentage of net revenue on compliance (14.9% com-
pared to 8.6% for small firms), small firms spend a greater amount in revenue and employ-
ment (19.6% compared to 14.3% for large firms). SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, THE COSTS OF
COMPLIANCE IN THE U.S. SECURITIES INDUSTRY: SURVEY REPORT 2, 5 (2006), available at
https://www.sifma.org/uploadedfiles/research/surveys/costofcompliancesurveyreport.
pdf.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 11  1-NOV-13 7:02
2013] BECOMING A FIFTH BRANCH 11
firm are one, while those costs for the larger firm are four.  On a per
asset basis, the regulatory costs are lower for the larger firm.  Smaller
firms in this kind of system must substantially outperform larger firms
in order to maintain competitive parity.  In this example, the smaller
firm must outperform the larger by sixty basis points.33
This handicap in scale is a significant problem only if larger firms
dominate the regulatory process either through the making or the
enforcing of rules.34  Such discrepancies may, of course, be inevitable.
Fees levied upon their members generally fund SROs, and these fees
are often disproportionately borne by larger firms.35  In addition, the
U.S. population of financial firms comprises relatively few large firms
amongst thousands of smaller firms.36  Thus, the large firms enjoy low
coordination costs and highly aligned interests.  Moreover, the politi-
cal influence of larger firms, be it with the SRO, the SRO’s govern-
mental overseer, or Congress, is likely to be much greater.37
33 To illustrate, consider a 10% return before compliance costs.  This rate returns
$110 to the smaller firm and $1100 for the larger firm.  Subtracting the compliance costs
yields a net return of $109 for the smaller firm and $1096 for the larger firm.  These dollar
amounts translate to a return of 9% for the smaller firm and 9.6% for the larger firm.
34 Importantly, this is true regardless of whether the regulator is the government or
an SRO.  The public-choice literature abounds with evidence of regulatory capture by
large, concentrated interests.  For some recent evidence of this in the regulation of broker-
dealers by the SEC, see  Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from
Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 728 (2012) (finding larger firms fared
better in enforcement actions (e.g., fewer individuals charged, more use of administrative
sanctions instead of court proceedings, and lower sanctions) than similarly situated smaller
firms).
35 See, e.g., Melanie Waddell, FINRA to Hike BD Fees in Effort to Recoup ‘Significant Loss,’
ADVISORONE, Apr. 27, 2012, http://www.advisorone.com/2012/04/27/finra-to-hike-bd-
fees-in-effort-to-recoup-signific (describing the current fee structure, which ranges from
membership to trading activity, and noting recent FINRA fee increases).
36 FINRA has more than 4300 members, the overwhelming majority of which are
smaller firms. See SMART BOND INVESTING, FINRA ii (2013), available at http://www.finra.
org/web/groups/investors/@inv/@smart/documents/investors/p125843 (“[FINRA] is
the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United
States.  FINRA’s mission is to protect America’s investors by making sure the securities
industry operates fairly and honestly.  All told, FINRA oversees about 4,380 brokerage
firms, about 163,150 branch offices and approximately 633,000 registered securities
representatives.”).
37 A recently released study shows that the SEC is more likely to spare larger firms the
potential consequences of enforcement action by approving a greater number of waivers
for violations by even repeat offenders, which “has fueled concern in some quarters that
the agency is too sympathetic to powerful firms.” PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, DANGER-
OUS LIAISONS: REVOLVING DOOR AT SEC CREATES RISK OF REGULATORY CAPTURE 11 (2013)
[hereinafter POGO STUDY].  The Project on Government Oversight is a watchdog of the
government. See About POGO, POGO, http://www.pogo.org/about/ (last visited Sept. 24,
2013).  Therefore, the views expressed in the study may be slightly critical of the practices
of the SEC.  The fact remains, however, that the larger firms are given preferential treat-
ment and, given the governmentalization of the SRO model, these kinds of practices may
ultimately trickle down to FINRA.
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In some instances, efforts have been made to minimize this prob-
lem.  For instance, after several scandals, the SEC required FINRA to
include more members of the public on its board of directors.38  Simi-
larly, the quasi-judicial body that hears appeals from FINRA discipli-
nary and membership matters (known as the FINRA National
Adjudicatory Council) also comprises an equal number of industry in-
siders (seven) and outsiders (seven).39  Whether these governance
mechanisms constrain large firms from dominating the rulemaking
process is unclear.
Self-regulation is easily justified if it protects investors and maxi-
mizes social welfare but may not be if it is used merely to transfer
wealth from investors to brokers.  This “cartelization” problem is pre-
sent in almost every area of broker-dealer regulation.  Thus, most of
the regulatory debates concerning self-regulation feature contention
over which of these two forces—the efficiency of self-regulation versus
the risk of cartelization—is more prominent or likely in a particular
situation.  The problem that observers encounter in evaluating the ef-
ficacy and legitimacy of self-regulation is that the steps to create and
enforce a cartel are hard to distinguish from steps necessary to help
investors through the policing of bad brokers.
Whatever the theoretical limitations upon financial self-regula-
tion, no other arena of vital economic activity in this country has regu-
lated itself for so long or so comprehensively.  To those who believe
that effective regulation is possible only when imposed externally or
governmentally, the regulation of financial brokers stands as a power-
ful counterexample.40  Next, we provide a sketch of the history of bro-
ker regulation, paying particular attention to how the relationship
between government and private regulators has changed over time.
C. Evolving from SRO to QGO: The Case of FINRA
An account of the regulation of stockbrokers in the United States
illustrates the phenomenon of governmentalization that we are at-
tempting to explain in this Article.  Although a history of financial
38 See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. R
39 See National Adjudicatory Council, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforce
ment/Adjudication/NAC/naccommittee/ (last updated Jan. 17, 2013).
40 In the case of financial regulation, government and private regulation are imper-
fect substitutes for one another.  Where one is powerful or effective, there is less need for
the other.  In this sense, brokerage is more akin to the sale of typical products, where any
harm caused by defects is born primarily by the consumer of the product.  Note, however,
that products liability is not an area in which we see powerful self-regulation.  Although
there is widespread third-party attestation—for example, the Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval or Consumers Reports—the law of products liability contains no real self-regula-
tory component.
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SROs is far beyond our scope,41 a brief sketch of the major inflection
points of regulation demonstrates how the self-regulatory nature of
financial SROs has grown increasingly governmental.  These particu-
lar SROs are becoming or, as some have argued, have become quasi-
governmental organizations (QGO).
Professor Roberta Karmel described the evolution of the SRO for
Wall Street professionals this way: “From the enactment of [the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934] until the present, Congress and the SEC
have struggled to convert SROs from ‘private clubs’ to public bodies,
frequently exploiting scandals to impose governance reforms on ex-
changes and the NASD.”42  In a recent speech, SEC Commissioner
Daniel M. Gallagher asked, “Is FINRA becoming a ‘deputy SEC’?”43
To trace this history from private club to deputy SEC, we divide
the history of broker regulation into five major periods spanning ap-
proximately two centuries, from the earliest trading on Wall Street in
the late eighteenth century until today.  Those periods are roughly as
follows: (1) the Pre–New Deal period (1780s to 1930s); (2) the New
Deal and Post–New Deal period (1930s to 1963); (3) the Reform pe-
riod (1963 to 1996); (4) the 21A Report period (1996 to 2007); and
(5) the FINRA period (2007 to present).  At each inflection point, one
or more of the mechanisms we describe below appears to cause the
SROs to change in fundamental ways.
Pre–New Deal period.  Regulation of stockbrokers in the United
States arose originally not from the government but from the brokers
themselves.  The first rules emerged through a private “club” of
“stockjobbers” attempting primarily to increase their value via mem-
bership and private rules and discipline.44  In fact, as late as 1937, SEC
chairman William O. Douglas referred to the stock markets as “ ‘a pri-
vate club’ with ‘elements of a casino.’”45  Beginning with the first cen-
tralized trading in lower Manhattan during the late 1700s, brokers
policed themselves in an effort to build trust with clients and to elimi-
nate bad actors from the profession.  As described by the SEC Histori-
cal Society, the first SROs provided “a refuge for securities traders
41 For more complete treatments of the history of financial SROs, see generally Ar-
thur B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW.
395 (2010) (exploring the debate over regulating brokers and advisors); Donna M. Nagy, Is
the PCAOB a “Heavily Controlled Component” of the SEC?: An Essential Question in the Constitu-
tional Controversy, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 361 (2010) (analyzing the characterization of the
PCAOB and its constitutional implications); James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competi-
tion to Enforce the Securities Law, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115 (2012) (assessing the debate sur-
rounding the enforcement of securities laws).
42 Karmel, supra note 18, at 153. R
43 Gallagher, supra note 2. R
44 For a general discussion, see BANNER, supra note 12, at 171–75. R
45 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 73 (quoting William O. Douglas). R
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vulnerable to popular suspicion of their profession.”46  From the late
1780s until 1938, these private membership rules were the primary
means by which brokers were regulated.47
The self-regulation of stockbrokers began not so much to fill a
regulatory void but rather to forestall regulation.  In 1792, the New
York state legislature made contracts for the sale of stock owned by
others unenforceable in New York courts.48  Accordingly, the only way
that the growing stock brokerage industry in New York could continue
to grow and flourish was by creating its own parallel legal system that
could, through private rules, enforce such bargains.  This early form
of private enforcement built primarily on efforts at cartelization by
brokers.
Just prior to the enactment of the New York stockjobbing act, the
industry engaged in nascent efforts at forming a self-regulatory frame-
work.49  Finally, in 1817, a group of nearly thirty brokers formed the
46 The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities Industry,
1792–2010, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/muse
um/galleries/sro/sro02a.php (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
47 There was then, as there are now, some state-law overlay policing fraud and other
abuses by brokers.  So-called blue sky laws—as in trying to prevent brokers from selling
investors “the clear blue sky”—originated in Kansas in 1911 and were adopted by almost
every state thereafter. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 8.1, at
401 (4th ed. 2001).  Although states retain significant authority to license and regulate
broker dealers, the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA) pre-
empted various state securities regulations of brokers. See National Securities Markets Im-
provement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).  Specifically, NSMIA added section 15(h) to the Securities Exchange
Act, which preempts state-based rules on various financial responsibility metrics (such as
capital and margin requirements) and reporting requirements. See id. § 103(a).
48 See 1817 N.Y. Laws, 329, 333 (continuing in force statute passed in 1792).  For a
discussion of the laws, see BANNER, supra note 12, at 171–75. R
49 A few months earlier, the earliest-known effort was published on a broadside,
which called for “a meeting of the dealers in the public funds in the city of New-York held
at the Coffee-House.” See WALTER WERNER & STEVEN T. SMITH, WALL STREET 190–91 (1991)
(emphasis omitted).  At this meeting, a group of dealers in government debt, the first type
of publicly traded security in the United States, agreed to be bound by fourteen rules,
including a prohibition against dealing with nonparticipating brokers and a limitation on
the number of securities that could be sold in a given day. See BANNER, supra note 12, at R
250–51.  This early attempt at cartelization failed after a crash in the public debt markets in
1792. See id.  Several other attempts to build an exclusive exchange followed.  In May 1792,
twenty-four brokers agreed to fix commissions at one-quarter of one percent. Id.  Known
as the “Buttonwood Agreement,” popular mythology holds that this agreement was signed
under a buttonwood tree and that it grew into the New York Stock Exchange.  Both parts
of this story are untrue, and the agreement proved equally untenable. See Peter Eisenstadt,
How the Buttonwood Tree Grew: The Making of a New York Stock Exchange Legend, 19 PROSPECTS
75 (1994).  A third agreement by brokers tried to create an exclusive club with member-
ship interests for the trading of securities.  Known as the Tontine Coffee-House, its mem-
bers included John Jacob Astor and Brockholst Livingston. BANNER, supra note 12, at R
252–53.  This trading group had rivals, and no single group of brokers was able to domi-
nate trading during the first part of the nineteenth century. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 15  1-NOV-13 7:02
2013] BECOMING A FIFTH BRANCH 15
New York Stock and Exchange Board.50  The Board grew and changed
as the market for securities increased over the next few decades.  The
average daily trading volume increased more than fifty fold during
this period as the number of securities listed grew from about twenty-
five to more than one hundred.51  In response, the Board increased
the formality of its membership processes and the rules by which it
conducted its business.52  But the Board never acquired a majority of
the stock trades on Wall Street, and about three times as many trades
took place “in brokers’ offices, in coffee houses, and in the street.”53
In addition, rival brokerage associations, such as ones for mining
stocks created in the late 1850s, and rival exchanges, such as ones cre-
ated in the mid-1830s and mid-to-late 1840s, rose and collapsed.54  By
1860, the Board “dominated securities trading in New York,” in part
because its reputation allowed it to determine the prices at which
other trades would happen most effectively.55
The Board acquired this reputation in part through its creation
of a “miniature legal system” that included rules governing trading
and disputes among brokers.56  As noted above, for the entire first
half of the nineteenth century, so-called time contracts, which in-
cluded most broker transactions, were unenforceable in New York.
Accordingly, purely private law was the only mechanism for guarantee-
ing the performance of such contracts.  A majority vote of the Board’s
members originally determined the outcome of disputes: “All ques-
tions of dispute in the purchase or sale of [s]tocks” were “decided by a
majority of the [B]oard.”57  As the membership grew and the number
of disputes accumulated, subsets of the Board took on this quasi-judi-
cial role, and the decisions in individual cases took on the nature of
precedent.58  This extragovernmental regulation increased public
confidence in brokers associated with the Board and thereby attracted
business.59
New York’s highest court explicitly blessed the nongovernmental
character of the early SROs in Belton v. Hatch,60 decided in 1888.  In
Belton, a broker who was suspended from the Exchange for unsound
practices sued to recover the value of its seat, which the Exchange had
50 BANNER, supra note 12, at 253. R
51 Id. at 255.
52 Id. at 260 (“By 1848, the Board had acquired a reputation for being ‘very exclusive
in its character.’”).
53 Id. at 256.
54 See ROBERT SOBEL, THE CURBSTONE BROKERS 17–19 (1970).
55 BANNER, supra note 12, at 257. R
56 Id. at 271.
57 CONST. OF N.Y. STOCK & EXCHANGE BOARD of 1817, § 17.
58 BANNER, supra note 12, at 272–75. R
59 Id. at 261.
60 17 N.E. 225 (N.Y. 1888).
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sold to another broker.61  Denying the claim for recovery of the sum,
the court enforced the contract between the plaintiff and the Ex-
change, holding that the Exchange could use the privilege of mem-
bership as a regulatory tool.  The court concluded that
there is nothing against public policy [in this conclusion], for the
reason that whatever a member acquires is subject to the self-im-
posed condition that his title and the rights which accrue from his
membership are regulated by and dependent upon the laws
adopted by [the Exchange], and expressly consented to by him
when he joined.62
Notably, however, the self-regulation of the exchanges did not cover
the vast majority of stock transactions, which happened in so-called
over-the-counter transactions.63  These transactions would find no real
regulatory oversight until the late 1930s.64
New Deal and Post–New Deal period.  This self-regulatory scheme
survived as the primary, if not sole, source of oversight of stock trans-
actions following the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent
economic depression.  Although contentious in light of more recent
research,65 at the time the conventional wisdom of the cause of the
crash and the depression was “unregulated speculation in securi-
ties.”66  Accordingly, the Roosevelt Administration drew up legislation
that would largely displace the private regulators by, among other
things, requiring that government employees (specifically the Federal
Trade Commission, in its guise as precursor to the SEC) approve all
exchange rules and regulations.67  According to Joel Seligman’s his-
tory of the SEC, this proposal was “tantamount to a declaration of war”
on Wall Street and led to an intense lobbying campaign by brokers to
kill the bill.68  The “happy compromise” reached in the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 was the creation of an SEC with the power to write
and enforce new rules but with the preexisting regulatory apparatus
largely in place.69
Self-regulation also expanded in this period.  During the early
days of the SEC, Chairman James Landis proposed using self-regula-
tion as a way of efficiently regulating the nearly 6000 unregulated se-
61 Id. at 225.
62 Id. at 226.
63 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 140–41. R
64 See id. at 141–44.
65 See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960 (1963) (arguing that excessively tight economic policy
following the boom of the 1920s turned an otherwise normal recession into the Great
Depression).
66 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 76 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt). R
67 Id. at 85.
68 Id. at 86, 88–96.
69 Id. at 100.
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curities dealers in the over-the-counter market.  Landis proposed the
SEC “help in the organization of a self-disciplinary agency of deal-
ers . . . [j]ust as the disciplinary committees of the exchanges have
been invaluable to us in our efforts to supervise the activities on the
exchanges.”70  The problem of direct regulation in the absence of a
private supplement was “a little bit like trying to build a structure out
of dry sand.”71
To create the “cohesive force” that would bind the sand together,
Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act with the Maloney Act
of 1938.72  The Maloney Act authorized the creation of one or more
SROs for the over-the-counter market.73  The regulatory conceit was
to use a private body’s “ample contractual powers over members to
take a hand in enforcing the law.”74  Chairman Douglas defended the
Maloney Act to the Harford Bond Club this way:
By and large, government can operate satisfactorily only by proscrip-
tion.  That leaves untouched large areas of conduct and activity;
some of it susceptible of government regulation but in fact too min-
ute for satisfactory control; some of it lying beyond the periphery of
the law in the realm of ethics and morality.  Into these large areas
self-government, and self-government alone, can effectively reach.75
Fourteen months after passage of the Act, the SEC approved the regis-
tration request of the (NASD), the one and only SRO for the over-the-
counter market ever approved.76  By offering NASD members a dis-
count on stock trades executed with other members, the NASD soon
counted more than eighty percent of securities dealers as members.77
Regulators initially wanted to require membership but could not do
so until scandals in 1983 made that goal more politically tenable.78
Reform period.  Over the next twenty or so years, some serious fail-
ures of self-regulation appeared.  Perhaps the most prominent exam-
ple involved the American Stock Exchange (formerly the rival to the
NYSE and known as the “Curb Exchange,” as in stocks sold outside the
exchange floor on the curb) and brokers Elliot & Company and Gilli-
70 Id. at 143 (quoting James Landis).
71 Id. at 185 (quoting George Mathews).
72 See generally Comment, Over-the-Counter Trading and the Maloney Act, 48 YALE L.J. 633,
637–44 (1939) (“The Maloney Act is intended to deal with those factors which prevent the
over-the-counter markets, in their present unorganized condition, from giving the invest-
ing public the same uniformly fair treatment which the Commission has by regulation
made available upon the national securities exchanges.”).
73 Maloney Act of 1938, ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3 (2012)).
74 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 186 (quoting William O. Douglas). R
75 Id.
76 Id. at 188.
77 Id.
78 See infra note 103 and surrounding text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 18  1-NOV-13 7:02
18 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1
gan, Will.  The SEC ultimately uncovered rampant failures, including
the manipulation of securities prices, illegal touting, bribery, illegal
use of inside information, and publication of misleading prospec-
tuses.79  The problem was not merely the presence of a few bad apples
but amounted to “a general deficiency of standards and a fundamen-
tal failure of controls.”80  The director of the SEC’s Division of Trad-
ing and Exchanges called it a “breakdown” of the self-regulation of
the Exchange.81
William Cary, President Kennedy’s choice as the new chair of the
SEC, immediately seized upon these failures to conduct a special study
of the “adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules of na-
tional securities exchanges and national securities associations.”82
The Special Study did not completely shake the “continued belief in
self-regulation as an ingredient in the protection of the investor,”83
but it did conclude that “industry self-regulation consistently had been
self-interested and self-protective, often failing to produce standards
of conduct superior to those that existed before the enactment of the
securities laws.”84  The study recommended enhanced government
oversight in areas ranging from suitability rules to licensing require-
ments for new brokers.85
Although the bulk of the Securities Act Amendments of 1964
flowing from the Special Study focused on enhanced disclosure by
firms and a breakdown between the categories of listed and unlisted
securities, they did enhance the ability of NASD to deny membership
for unqualified brokers.86  Another proposed provision to require
NASD membership was not adopted by Congress: the NASD per-
suaded the SEC to remove language from an initial bill.87  Specifically,
sections 15 and 15A required the NASD to ensure all brokers and as-
sociated persons meet “specified and appropriate standards with re-
spect to training, experience and such other qualifications” as
necessary to protect investors.88
79 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 284–86. R
80 Id. at 288 (quoting an SEC staff study of the American Stock Exchange).
81 Id. at 289.
82 Id. at 295 (quoting William Cary).
83 Id. at 299 (quoting William Cary).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 299–300.
86 The Special Study recommended rigorous standards for exchanges and broker-
dealer firms. Id. at 301 (citing SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95 (1963)).
87 Id. at 316–17.
88 Hugh F. Owens, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address Before the Practicing
Law Institute: The Securities Act Amendments of 1964 12 (Oct. 16, 1964) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1964/101664owens.pdf.
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The SEC was, however, unable to achieve several proposed objec-
tives, such as the ban on floor trading or an increase of the public role
in governance of the exchanges and the other SROs.89  As with earlier
attempts at regulation, these would have to wait for additional crises
to make them possible.
The “back-office crisis” of 1967–70 was one such event.  The cri-
sis, notably similar to a paperwork problem in the most recent finan-
cial crisis, was about lax back-office documentation of trades.  From
1964 to 1968, average daily volume on the NYSE grew by 265%.90  Re-
flecting “an industrywide loss of control of record-keeping proce-
dures,” the number of complaints against brokers rose from about
4000 in 1968 to over 12,000 just one year later.91  According to Joel
Seligman, this amounted to “the most serious failure of securities self-
regulation in the [SEC]’s history.”92  The government’s study of the
problem concluded that the “industry concentrated its resources on
sales, and paid insufficient attention to properly handling and
processing the business brought in by its sales efforts.”93  According to
Seligman, “the back-office crisis had focused attention [in Congress]
on the securities industry, and many members of Congress were
openly hostile to the [NYSE]’s long-advanced arguments [about self-
regulation].”94
In response to the crises of the late 1960s (including a stock mar-
ket crash in 1969–70), Congress increased government control of and
the governmental nature of Wall Street SROs in two ways.  The Securi-
ties Investor Protection Act of 1970 created an FDIC-analog for cus-
tomer funds held by brokers.95  In addition, Congress gave the SEC
the power to require any SRO to adopt rules or procedures regarding
the inspection of brokers and the licensing requirements for the in-
dustry, to require reporting to regulators of brokers’ financial condi-
tion, and to require inspection of specific brokers.96
89 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 326–28, 333. R
90 Id. at 451.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 450.
93 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND
DEALERS, H.R. DOC. NO. 92-231, at 95 (1971).
94 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 478–79.  It is worth noting that this failure was not R
something that was obviously avoidable in a world of direct regulation by the SEC, a point
we will return to below.  It is also worth noting there were numerous reported successes of
self-regulation over the period.  One incident involved the NYSE’s response to the failure
of the brokerage firm Ira Haupt & Company.  Even critics of self-regulation point out that
it “seemed to establish the wisdom of the SEC’s policy of deferring to the Exchange on
oversight of member firms’ operations and finances.” Id. at 461.  As we discuss below,
successes are likely less salient in terms of governmentalization than failures.
95 Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1637 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (1971)).
96 See id.
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The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 were another watershed
change in the nature of broker SROs.97  The statute gave the SEC its
long-sought-after power to initiate as well as to approve SRO rules and
rulemaking procedures.98  As Roberta Karmel describes it, “the SEC
obtained greater authority to regulate and supervise the NYSE, other
exchanges and the NASD.”99  The statute also “expanded the SEC’s
role in SRO enforcement and discipline, and allowed the SEC to play
an active role in structuring the public securities markets.”100  Perhaps
most importantly, the statute altered the governance of the SRO by
mandating particular compositions of boards of directors.101  The Ex-
change Act thus provided that the SROs must “assure a fair represen-
tation of its members in the selection of its directors and
administration of its affairs and provide that one or more directors
shall be representative of issuers and investors and not be associated
with a member of the exchange, broker, or dealer.”102
Just a few years later, Congress further tightened the regulatory
grip of SROs by requiring that every broker-dealer be registered with
an SRO.103  The New Dealers had desired this requirement, but it
97 The Martin Report, issued in 1971, was intended to remove the private character of
the NYSE and turn it into a quasi-public entity. See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats into
Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS
L.J. 367, 405–06 (2002).
98 See Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 19(c), 89 Stat. 97, 150
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also S. REP. NO. 94-75, at 131 (1975)
(“[With the addition of Section 19(c),] the SEC would be granted the power to change the
rules of a self-regulatory organization in any respect, not just with respect to certain enu-
merated areas.”).
99 Karmel, supra note 18, at 159.  The SEC gained further control of the SROs by R
mandating minimum listing requirements. See Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule
Change 42, Fed. Reg. 14,793, 14,794 (Mar. 16, 1977).
100 Karmel, supra note 18, at 160. R
101 Exchange Act § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3) (2012); Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4),
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4).  The change in dynamics of the corporate board since 1975 fur-
ther demonstrates the ratcheting effect in that the separation of the Board from the indus-
try has enabled decisions that industry members otherwise would have approved.  When
FINRA received permission from the SEC to increase membership dues and assessments to
account for the decrease in regulatory fees and investment portfolio, many members ob-
jected but were overruled by the Board.  Another member-approved proposal rejected by
the Board of Governors was to give members the right to cast a vote on “say-on-pay” for
FINRA executive compensation.  Kenneth B. Orenbach, A New Twist to an On-Going Debate
About Securities Self-Regulation: It’s Time to End FINRA’s Federal Income Tax Exemption, 31 VA.
TAX REV. 135, 154–57 (2011).
102 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3) (2012).  Two key Supreme Court decisions in 1975, though
not directly based on the Amendments of 1975, further supported the notion of self-regu-
lation with federal government oversight: Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659,
667 (1975), and United States v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 726–27
(1975).
103 Act of June 6, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-38, § 3, 97 Stat. 205, 206 (amending Securities
Exchange Act §§ 15(b)(8), (9), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-4(b)(8), (9)) (“It shall be unlawful for
any broker or dealer . . . to effect any transaction in, or induce or attempt to induce the
purchase or sale of, any security . . . unless such broker or dealer is . . . registered . . . .”); see
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took the various crises of the nineteen fifties, sixties, and seventies to
make it a reality.
21A Report period.  Over the next several years, the markets under-
went tremendous changes. The growth of the mutual fund industry,
the end of fixed commissions on the exchanges, the birth104 and
growth of the over-the-counter markets known as NASDAQ,105 and
the growth of so-called day traders brought tremendous regulatory
pressure upon SROs and the SEC.106  More and more Americans be-
came involved in the stock market, and their use of brokers’ services
increased.
Under the chairmanship of Arthur Levitt, the SEC began to in-
crease its enforcement efforts on top of SRO efforts.107  In 1996, for
instance, the SEC, NASD, and NYSE conducted a “sweep” of over 100
small- and medium-sized brokers, finding that many were engaging in
substandard hiring and monitoring practices.108  In addition, the De-
partment of Justice increased prosecutions, convicting seventeen
“rogue brokers” in ten states in 1997 alone.109
But the most significant regulatory development involved a fun-
damental remake of broker SROs.  The change started with a NASD
committee led by former Senator Warren Rudman, which concluded
that “[f]undamental change is required” to “NASD’s governance
structure” as a result of growth in markets and expansion of NASD’s
dual role as regulator and owner of NASDAQ.110
Shortly after the Rudman report, Professors William Christie and
Paul Schultz released a study titled Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers
also James T. Koebel, Trust and the Investment Adviser Industry: Congress’ Failure to Realize
FINRA’s Potential to Restore Investor Confidence, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 61, 70–72 (2010)
(“Broker-dealers are statutorily obligated to pay dues to the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation, and are further subject to numerous duties, including suitability, best execu-
tion, fair dealing, and the prohibition of excessive markups and churning of customer
accounts.  Moreover, they are subject to the Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions, as well as
financial soundness regulations set by the SEC.” (footnotes omitted)).
104 Laby, supra note 41, at 405–08. R
105 Id. at 423.
106 Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Before the Senate Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs: Con-
cerning Day Trading (Sept. 16, 1999), http://sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchive/1999/
tsty2099.htm.
107 Statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Press Conference
Regarding the NASD (Aug. 8, 1996).
108 See NASD Joins SEC, Others, in National Regulatory Sweep, 10 NASD REG. & COMPLI-
ANCE ALERT 1, 1, 3–4, (1996), available at http://c0403731.cdn.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.
com/collection/papers/1990/1996_0401_NASD_RCA.pdf.
109 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 645. R
110 NAT’L ASS’N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE
NASD SELECT COMMITTEE ON STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE TO THE NASD BOARD OF GOVER-
NORS 9 (1995), available at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1990/1995_
0919_RudmanNASD.pdf.
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Avoid Odd-Eighths Quotes?, concluding that there was “an implicit
agreement among market makers to avoid using odd-eighths” in or-
der to increase their profits.111  This study prompted a 1994 investiga-
tion by the DOJ and a landmark study by the SEC, known as the
“21(a) Report,”112 after the provision authorizing the study.  The ad-
ministrative proceeding following the report concluded that “NASD
was aware of information suggesting that its members were engaged in
misconduct which had potential anticompetitive implications and
could be detrimental to the interests of investors,” and yet took no
regulatory action against them.113  The SEC censured the NASD,
fined it, and required it to “enhance its systems for market surveil-
lance.”114  In the wake of the report, the SEC required NASD to make
fundamental changes to its governance, to its membership and licens-
ing rules, to its investigation and enforcement policies, and to its pro-
cedural code.115  For instance, prior to the 21(a) Report, members sat
in disciplinary matters as quasi grand juries to decide whether to bring
an enforcement case against individuals or firms.116  This arrange-
ment was a prototypical example of self-regulation.  But after the fail-
ure to enforce cartel behavior in bid-ask spreads, the SEC required
that enforcement actions be made via a centralized department, the
Washington, D.C. headquarters of NASD.117  The SEC also “insisted
on new management at NASD,” and it handpicked Frank Zarb, a
friend of Chairman Levitt’s for the job.118
FINRA period.  After the bursting of the dot-com bubble, the ac-
counting scandals, and the series of corporate collapses in the early
2000s, another important change came to broker SROs.  In 2007, the
SEC approved the merger of the NASD (the enforcement arm of the
111 William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-
Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813, 1814 (1994).
112 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EX-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934 REGARDING THE NASD AND THE NASDAQ MARKET (1996), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/nd21a-report.txt.
113 Order Instituting Public Proceedings, Exchange Act Release at 3, Nat’l Ass’n of
Sec. Dealers, Inc., No. 37538 (Aug. 8, 1996).
114 Id. at 5.
115 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 700–01. R
116 See, e.g., Mary Schapiro, President, NASD Regulation, Inc., Speech at the SIA Secur-
ities Industry Institute at the Wharton School (Mar. 11, 1997), http://www.finra.org/News
room/Speeches/Schapiro/P011111 (“When the new Code is approved, professional hear-
ing officers will preside over disciplinary proceedings and District Committees will no
longer perform a ‘grand jury’ function.”).
117 This marked the separation between the trading and regulatory functions of the
NASD.  In light of the new requirement that the board consist of a majority of nonindustry
members, following the merger in 2007 with the NYSE (which delegated its regulatory
responsibilities), FINRA no longer has connections to the industry professionals and trad-
ing markets that constituted the “self” in self-regulation. See McLaughlin, supra note 19, at R
112.
118 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 702. R
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pre-NASDAQ NASD) and the enforcement arm of the NYSE into a
single industry SRO known as FINRA.119  Efficiency through econo-
mies of scale and scope was the official justification for the merger.120
The idea was to “increase efficient, effective, and consistent regula-
tion of securities firms, provide cost savings to securities firms of all
sizes, and strengthen investor protection and market integrity.”121
According to NASD, additional benefits were to “streamline the
broker-dealer regulatory system, combine technologies, and permit
the establishment of a single set of rules and a single set of examiners
with complementary areas of expertise within a single SRO.”122  The
SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, noted that the SEC “will work
closely with FINRA to eliminate unnecessarily duplicative regulation,
including consolidating and strengthening what until now have been
two different member rulebooks and two different enforcement
systems.”123
The creation of FINRA created a monopoly for broker SROs, with
both good and bad effects.  As discussed below, this change made SEC
control perhaps more likely and increased the interaction between
the SEC and the SRO.  As a condition of the merger, the SEC re-
quired that FINRA’s bylaws increase public representation on the
board, such that now eleven of the twenty-three seats are for public
board members.124  In addition, the interaction between FINRA and
the SEC has increased, perhaps most notably through the recent ap-
pointment of former FINRA chief executive officer Mary Schapiro as
Chair of the SEC.125
* * *
The FINRA story is one of dramatic transition from self-regula-
tion to quasi-governmental regulation.  Although the transition is not
complete and federal courts have not conclusively deemed FINRA to
be a purely governmental actor,126 the increasing departure from self-
119 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Gives Regulatory Approval for NASD
and NYSE Consolidation (July 27, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-151.
htm.
120 See, e.g., Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Related to Consolidation of Reg-
ulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169, 42,181 (Aug. 1, 2007).
121 Id. at 42,169.
122 Id. at 42,188.
123 Press Release, supra note 119 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
124 Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Related to Consolidation of Regulatory
Functions of NASD and NYSE, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169, 42,170 (July 26, 2007).
125 See SEC Biography: Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http:/
/www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/schapiro.htm (last updated Dec. 11, 2012).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863, 867–69 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding
that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply in questioning because regulatory activ-
ities do not rise to the level of state action); Application of Justin F. Ficken, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-54699, 89 SEC Docket 650, 654 (Nov. 3, 2006) (noting that cooperation
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regulation is unmistakable.127  Whether SROs become fully govern-
mental is a matter for their members, legislatures, and regulators to
determine in the years ahead.  That they have grown increasingly gov-
ernmental in the years past is clear.  We next attempt to describe the
mechanisms that are driving this transformation.
II
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNMENTALIZATION
In this Part, we identify the mechanisms that may influence the
character and behavior of self-regulatory organizations.  Our thesis is
that several of these factors are increasingly leading SROs to resemble
the governmental agencies that oversee their activities and that SROs
therefore might more accurately be dubbed QGOs.  Over the past few
decades, some financial SROs appear to have lost much of the “self” in
self-regulatory organization, and that element of independence has
been replaced with a more governmental approach.  We call the pro-
cess by which this is happening the “governmentalization” of SROs.
By governmentalization, we mean a process through which ostensibly
private activities or organizations acquire the characteristics, func-
tions, or appearance of government.128  While any regulatory body, be
it an SRO or a private club (such as a golf club or a university), that
administers rules of conduct necessarily engages in governance, we
contemplate a more formal invocation of the powers and punishment
of a sovereign.  Along the spectrum of governance, one pole may be
thought of as purely governmental action (such as formal charges
brought by federal prosecutors) while the other is purely private (such
as the informal rules of decorum encouraged at a family dinner ta-
ble).  Much of the operations of financial SROs lie somewhere be-
tween these extremes; it is our contention that the nature of those
activities is evolving more toward the governmental direction.
Government action, for these purposes, exhibits several key char-
acteristics that differentiate it from nongovernment action.  As a mat-
ter of practice, the federal government takes action through a highly
formal bureaucracy subject to compendious legislation governing civil
between SEC and NASD “will rarely render NASD a state actor”); see also D.L. Cromwell
Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 161–63 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that
merely sharing information with another governmental agency without indicia of entwine-
ment is not sufficient to establish state action); Application of Frank P. Quattrone, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-53547, 87 SEC Docket 1847, 1850 n.20 (Mar. 24, 2006) (“We
note that our cases as well as federal court opinions hold consistently that NASD discipli-
nary proceedings are not state action.”).
127 Karmel, supra note 18, at 195. R
128 We borrow and adapt this term from Michel Foucault. See Michel Foucault, Lec-
ture: Governmentality (Pasquale Pasquino, trans.), in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT 87 (Graham
Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
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service rules and protections.129  As the quotations from William O.
Douglas and others above suggest, government action is also more
blunt, being less capable of the enforcement of ethical and moral
judgments due to the external, third-party nature of the enforce-
ment.130  Government action is also uniquely powerful because it acts,
at its fundament, based upon its monopoly on lawful violence and be-
cause it is not beholden to competitive market forces.
Because of these factors, government action has been historically
perceived by many in this country to be potentially more dangerous or
coercive for those subject to its authority.  Accordingly, government
action is concomitantly subject to constitutional, legislative, and other
legal bulwarks.131  This array of protections from the awesome power
of the state establishes a set of presumptions that are held, to a greater
or lesser extent, by the public, depending on their own prior beliefs,
the regulatory circumstances, and other relevant facts.  Broadly,
though, individuals in the United States are likely to view many gov-
ernmental regulatory processes as more adversarial and potentially
consequential than private or nongovernmental processes, notwith-
standing the panoply of constitutional protections.
Governmentalization is the process by which nongovernmental
actors acquire more government-like characteristics—that is, the way
in which they become more rule bound, more adversarial, more bu-
reaucratic, and, most importantly, more capable of depriving their
subjects of life, liberty, or happiness.  Our examination of govern-
mentalization focuses primarily on the lessons that can be drawn from
the experience of FINRA as the securities industry’s most prominent
self-regulator.  These lessons demonstrate forces that may, in some
combination, be driving what we perceive to be a move from self-regu-
lation to quasi-governmental regulation and perhaps eventually to
outright governmental regulation.  We consider several potential
forces in turn while recognizing that they might act in isolation or any
variety of temporal or circumstantial combinations.  In short, we do
not purport to unveil a mechanical formula that produces govern-
mentalization but rather attempt to explore the variety of contexts
that may do so.
129 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012).
130 There is, of course, a huge range of types of government regulation in terms of
doctrine.  In some areas, it is highly rule bound while in others, like antitrust, it is a much
more standards-based approach.  But in all cases, there is a particular style to government
regulation, which is primarily what we mean when we use the term “governmenalization.”
131 See, e.g., Richard L. Stone & Michael A. Perino, Not Just a Private Club: Self Regulatory
Organizations as State Actors When Enforcing Federal Law, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 453,
492–93 (arguing that Congress delegated enforcement functions to SROs as part of a polit-
ical compromise and that SROs should be considered state actors when in that role).
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A. Mechanisms of Governmentalization
1. Nature of Financial Victims
The first potential driver of a change in the nature of self-regula-
tion is the type of individuals or institutions being regulated.  We
should expect the locus and intensity of regulation to correspond in
some degree to the characteristics of potential victims of wrongdoing.
If potential victims are notably weak and vulnerable, we should expect
to see one set of regulatory actors and choices, while if potential vic-
tims are comparatively strong and able to fend for themselves, we
should expect to find a different set.  Government has a greater inter-
est in protecting the vulnerable, so we would expect this interest to be
correlated with more direct control of regulation by government
officials.
Similarly, if potential victims are not central actors within the in-
dustry being regulated, then they are less likely to be able to partici-
pate in any self-regulatory system, so we should expect greater
governmental involvement and greater regulatory intensity.  Self-regu-
lation is likely to be more effective where the interests of those who
govern and those who are governed are closely aligned.  In addition, if
the potential victims and wrongdoers are easy to categorize ex ante,
then government regulation is more likely.  If two participants cannot
tell whether they will be on the wrong side of a particular transaction,
then the case for nongovernmental regulation is stronger, since
reputational forces and a balanced approach are more likely to arise
naturally.
These predictions are consistent with the observed pattern of the
allocation of private and public law.  We should not be surprised to
see purely private law governing disputes between different merchants
in an industry.  Lisa Bernstein’s work describing the almost com-
pletely autonomous self-regulation of the cotton and diamond indus-
tries demonstrates many of these characteristics: they are situations in
which the potential victims are sophisticated, repeat players, and diffi-
cult to characterize ex ante.132  At the other end of the private/public
law-enforcement spectrum are traditionally government-only spheres,
such as prohibitions on the use of violence or in areas like products
liability or environmental law.  Securities regulation, we believe, is a
milieu that falls somewhere between these extremes, though this was
not always the case.  And, as we contend in this Article, it will not
always remain so.
132 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Coopera-
tion Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1760 n.151, 1787–90
(2001).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 27  1-NOV-13 7:02
2013] BECOMING A FIFTH BRANCH 27
The federal securities laws impose significant restrictions on every
aspect of the process by which companies seek to raise money from
investors.133  Rules mandate extensive disclosures, govern the timing
and nature of all issuer communications, restrict who can buy and
how much they can buy, and impose strict liability for material mis-
statements or omissions by issuers.134  The regulatory burden is enor-
mous, but broad exceptions exist in cases involving investors who are
wealthy or financially sophisticated.135  The border of the SEC’s juris-
diction is based on a determination of whether or not the potential
victims in question need the protection of the securities laws or if in-
stead they can “fend for themselves.”136  In broad terms, the securities
regulations deem wealthy or sophisticated investors able to fend for
themselves but less wealthy or less sophisticated investors as unable to
do so.137  Accordingly the intensity of government regulation is strong
in the latter case and weak in the former case.
If the nature of potential victims is relevant to the type and locus
of regulation, then we would expect SRO regulation to exhibit
more private-like characteristics when the parties are sophisticated,
industry-insiders, or capable of fending for themselves (such as dia-
mond merchants), and self-regulation to be more quasi-governmental
where the opposite is true.  In short, the SRO model should dominate
in markets with relatively fewer vulnerable victims, and the QGO
model should be prevalent in circumstances with relatively more vul-
nerable victims.138
The evolution of FINRA, as we have described it, has involved a
significant shift in the governmental nature of its regulatory ap-
proach.  This increasing governmentalization has developed contem-
poraneously with two significant changes in the securities industry
during the same period.  The number of vulnerable individuals enter-
133 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  For a general overview, see The Laws that Govern the Securi-
ties Industry, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last up-
dated Aug. 30, 2012).
134 See HAZEN, supra note 47, at 15–26. R
135 See, e.g., Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–.502 (2013).
136 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
137 “Accredited investors” are able to invest in private offerings that are exempt from
the disclosure and other regulations. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504–.506.  The definition of ac-
credited investor includes, among other things, “[a]ny natural person who had an individ-
ual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years.”  17 C.F.R.
§ 230.501(a)(6).
138 Importantly, as discussed below, “vulnerable” is likely to be a context- and
product-specific inquiry.  While sophisticated investors, like banks or institutions, may be
“sophisticated” when dealing with plain-vanilla investments in stocks and bonds, they may
not be when dealing with complex derivatives transactions, as demonstrated by the recent
financial crisis.
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ing the investment market has increased, and the importance of the
broker as intermediary has consequently increased as well.
First, the number of individuals investing in securities products
has increased dramatically, and therefore the number of investors
who appear to need the protection of the securities laws has increased
as well.139  The number of brokerage accounts has increased nearly
2000% since 1980, at a compound annual growth rate of about 9%
per year.  Specifically, in 1980, there were fewer than 13 million indi-
vidual brokerage accounts; in 2012, there were approximately 264 mil-
lion.140  This growth cannot be explained by population growth,
which grew just 38% or about 1% per year (or nine times slower) over
the same period.141  Another way to see this development is to com-
pare individual investment in mutual funds as a percentage of the
population. In 1980, 5.7% of the country’s households owned mutual
funds while in 2012, 44.4% did.142  Accordingly, the type of investors
who may need the protection of the securities laws—that is, relatively
unsophisticated investors—appears to have increased as well.
Not only has the number of individual accounts grown dramati-
cally, but the growth correlates well with the timing of observable
changes in the nature of the self-regulation of securities markets.  As
noted above, the most substantial changes in the self-regulatory model
occurred during the decade from 1996 to 2006.  In the period starting
in 1980 and ending in 1996, the number of individual accounts in-
creased more than tenfold while it has less than doubled in the period
since then.143
Second, the large and growing amount of investments made in se-
curities by individuals is increasingly intermediated by brokers.  In
1965, institutional investors held less than 10% of publicly traded se-
curities in the United States.  By 2009, institutional investors held
139 The only way it could be otherwise is if the first entrants into a market are the less
sophisticated ones.  Although we do not have evidence on this point, this strikes us as
extremely unlikely.
140 INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 142 tbl.1 (53d ed. 2013),
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf.
141 See Selected Historical Decennial Census Population and Housing Counts, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/www/censusdata/hiscendata.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2013).
142 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 140, at 90 fig.6.1. R
143 See id. at 142 tbl.1.  These data do not necessarily imply causation.  It is plausible
that the change in the regulatory model caused the increase in the growth in the number
individual accounts.  But the timing of the growth in accounts does not fit well with this
story about causation.  In addition, it seems quite a stretch to believe that the changes in
the self-regulatory model were sufficiently quick and transparent to the public that they
caused a big change in the investment behavior of individuals.  The data do not discount
the possibility that there has been some impact on investment decisions by the regulatory
change, say through a lowering of brokerage fees and the like.
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50%.144  This nearly fifty percentage-point increase in the intermedia-
tion of the securities business is associated with the rise of the mutual
fund industry145 and other forms of collective investing, such as ETFs
and other pooled investment funds.146  As more “average” Americans
have entered the investment world, they have done so primarily using
regulated intermediaries.  The fact that accounts are more likely to be
held by brokers for the benefit of individual investors rather than by
the individual investors themselves increases the potential for abuse
by brokers, especially in ways that might implicate the integrity of a
regulatory process dominated by brokers.
The traditional approach to retirement investing was through the
use of “defined benefit” plans, in which a worker is promised a set
amount of money in regular increments during retirement.147  This
arrangement admits fewer occasions for cheating by brokers or other
securities professionals, and if cheating does occur, it does so at the
employer level, where the level of sophistication and risk bearing is
generally higher.  The more recent approach to retirement investing,
however, is via “defined contribution” plans, most popularly through
401(k) plans and individual retirement accounts.  In this type of re-
tirement investing, individual workers set aside a set amount of their
salary in regular installments, which they can then invest through a
menu of default options (most of which are usually mutual funds)
available in their 401(k) plan or individual retirement account.148  Al-
though such plans are governed by ERISA, which imposes fiduciary
duties upon their administrators, individuals (rather than professional
pension managers) are responsible for investment decisions and, ac-
cordingly, are more vulnerable to financial intermediaries who may be
determined to take advantage of less sophisticated customers.149
Take, for example, the recent case of Epstein v. SEC.150  The de-
fendant-broker worked for Merrill Lynch making mutual fund recom-
mendations to Merrill’s customers.151  He was compensated largely by
commissions, which he earned when customers changed their fund
144 Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 879 (2010).
145 INV. CO. INST., NAVIGATING INTERMEDIARY RELATIONSHIPS 2 (2009), available at
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_nav_relationships.pdf; see also Phillip R. Mack, Recent
Trends in the Mutual Fund Industry, 79 FED. RES. BULL. 1001, 1004–09 (1993) (documenting
the rapid growth of the mutual fund industry from the mid-1980s to early 1990s).
146 Arthur Laby also attributes this large growth in investor-directed funds to the com-
puterization of the brokerage business and the advent of discount brokers.  Laby, supra
note 41, at 422–24. R
147 See 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 25 (2013).
148 See id. § 24.
149 See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471–79
(2004).
150 416 F. App’x 142 (3d Cir. 2010).
151 Id. at 144.
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allocations or moved assets from one fund to another.152  The major-
ity of the broker’s customers “ranged in age from 71 to 93 years old
and were widowed, retired, and earned low annual incomes,” and yet
he made recommendations that they incur relatively large transaction
fees (and thus commissions for the broker) by switching mutual
funds, often into funds with higher fees.153  This type of misconduct is
unfortunately likely to be more common in a world in which average
investors, like the elderly victims in this case, are directly involved in
their investment decisions.154
In short, the past several decades have seen a dramatic increase in
the number of individuals directing the investment of their own assets
through the use of a retail intermediary.155  These factors understand-
ably prompted regulatory changes, not surprisingly toward a more
governmental direction.
2. Size of Potential Losses
The size of potential investor losses is a related factor that might
influence the nature of regulation.  For the class of unsophisticated
investors—the kind of investors described above who have recently en-
tered the market—the potential for relatively larger losses may ex-
plain a more formal, government-like regulatory role.  Put simply, the
state’s interest as “the investor’s advocate” is greater when potential
harm is greater.156  Therefore, when performing the cost-benefit anal-
ysis regarding the delegation of regulatory responsibility to an SRO,
the cost side of the equation increases as potential losses increase.  As-
suming the benefits of SRO regulation remain constant, this rise in
152 Id.
153 Id. at 145.  FINRA barred the broker from the industry for making unsuitable in-
vestments. Id. at 145–46.
154 See Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement Prepared-
ness: Evidence and Implications for Financial Education, 42 BUS. ECON. 35, 35 (2007) (“[M]any
[American] households are unfamiliar with even the most basic economic concepts
needed to make saving and investment decisions. . . .  [They] appear woefully under-in-
formed about basic financial concepts, with serious implications for saving, retirement
planning, mortgages, and other decisions.”); see also Note, Churning by Securities Dealers, 80
HARV. L. REV. 869, 872–74 (1967) (discussing the “naive” or “unsophisticated” customer).
155 See Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX
REV. 607, 626–27 (2000) (arguing that the government does not provide enough protec-
tion for defined contributions, thereby defeating the purpose of ERISA).
156 See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last updated Mar. 8, 2013); see also Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Speech at SEC Open Meeting: Preventing Investor Harm Should Be SEC Priority
Number One (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch
063010laa.htm (highlighting the SEC’s role as protector of investors and industry).
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costs will occasion a shift on the margin toward the QGO model or
even regulatory usurpation by the government entirely.157
The only way in which greater potential losses would support the
continued use of the SRO model is if somehow the benefits of the
SRO model, such as knowledge, information, and lower enforcement
costs, were increasing concurrently with the size of potential losses.
To analyze this, we can apply the simple model of punishment devel-
oped by economist Gary Becker.158  In Becker’s model, deterrence is a
product of the probability of detection and the punishment imposed.
To compare the relative efficacy of SRO versus governmental regula-
tion along this dimension for a given harm, one simply estimates these
two inputs.  Holding the probability of detection constant, achieving
optimal deterrence depends on the range of expected sanctions.  For
larger losses, the size of the sanctions must increase to achieve greater
deterrence.159  Since SROs are constrained in their types and severity
of sanctions—criminal sanctions are unavailable, and large fines are
rare and subject to recent criticism160—Becker’s analysis suggests that
increasing losses will prompt increasing governmentalization.161
Another factor also suggests an increasing government-like role
for regulators in tandem with a rise in the prevalence of retail invest-
ing.  As the losses for individuals increase, the political stability of the
SRO model may prove more fragile.  To appreciate this conjecture,
consider a case in which the regulator enjoys the same success rate at
vindicating investor losses, regardless of the stakes.  This parity would
mean that the chance that an investor who feels cheated is satisfied
with the outcome of the regulatory action is constant over time as the
amount at stake increases.  For example, assume the average loss for a
particular type of victim was $10,000, but that over time, it increased
to $50,000.  Assume also that 80% of victims were satisfied at both
times.  Although only 20% of victims are dissatisfied in both cases, in
the second period, the expected loss is $10,000 ($50,000 x 0.20), while
157 We discuss the rough trade-offs in this choice below, noting that the full govern-
ment option may be preferable to the QCO model.
158 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 172–80 (1968).
159 For example, FINRA’s Sanction Guidelines recommend for violations of selling away
a longer suspension period for the greater amount in dollars sold away in private securities
transactions. FINRA, SANCTIONS GUIDELINES 14 (2011), available at https://www.finra.org/
web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@sg/documents/industry/p011038.pdf; see also id. at
2–5 (setting forth FINRA’s general principles for determining sanctions).
160 See, e.g., Fiero v. FINRA, 660 F.3d 569, 577–79 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that FINRA
does not have the authority to bring court actions to collect fines for disciplinary violations
by members).
161 The precise contours will, of course, depend on the institutions and individuals
involved, since other factors include whether the parties are repeat players and will suffer
extralegal sanctions, such as reputational losses, from the conduct.
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in the earlier period, the expected loss is $2000 ($10,000 x 0.20).162
Insofar as the unsatisfied or uncompensated victims blame the SRO
generally for their lack of satisfaction, such dissatisfaction may in-
crease pressure on the SRO model, since the unsatisfied regulatory
expectations are five times as great.  This discontent might be true, for
instance, if victims believe that the SRO in question is merely a club of
insiders designed to protect themselves by forestalling government
regulation.  The important point is that, even assuming the number of
people who believe this and the intensity of their beliefs remain con-
stant over the period, the increased amount of losses increases the
likely impact of regulatory failure and therefore increased pressure to
move toward a different regulatory model.163  Note also that if the
belief that the SRO model is biased in favor of insiders increases with
increases in unsophisticated investment, then the expansion of the in-
vestment business to larger numbers of individuals (as described
above) may lead to an increase in the number of individuals holding
negative opinions of the SRO or the SRO model generally in the wake
of investment losses.164
This argument does not prove that all large losses can be regu-
lated effectively only by governmental regulators, as SROs have a long
tradition of policing very large trades by regulated parties.  It simply
points out that for average investors, an increase in the expected
amount at stake may impact the SRO cost-benefit analysis on the mar-
gin.  So, while an SRO model may be clearly superior with average
losses of $10,000, when they increase to $50,000, more deterrence
may be necessary, which might require greater government-like
regulation.
There exists evidence that the potential losses for individual in-
vestors may be rising.  Not only has the number of individuals invest-
ing increased sharply, but the total amount of money invested in
securities markets has as well.  In 1965, the total value of assets held by
Americans in individual mutual fund shareholder accounts was $35
billion or about $255 billion in 2012 dollars.165  In 2012, the total
value of those assets was $13 trillion.166  This growth amounts to a
nearly 5000% increase in the value of accounts held by the public.
162 Beyond this numerical example, the issue could simply be phrased as a belief that
the punishment was not sufficient.
163 Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s Penal-
ties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 963 (2012) (“[A]s long as the
industry generates profits for members, self-regulation can work.”).
164 See Gadinis, supra note 34, at 728 (showing that big-firm defendants fare better in R
regulatory enforcement proceedings).
165 See INV. CO. INST., supra note 140, at 142 tbl.1; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, CPI Inflation R
Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last
visited Oct. 6, 2013).
166 INV. CO. INST., supra note 140, at 142 tbl.1. R
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Investing in securities has become much more important to Ameri-
cans over this time and so too have the regulatory stakes.167
Evidence also exists to suggest that the relative importance of se-
curities investing has increased as well.  Over the past three decades,
households have shifted more of their liquid assets (that is, assets ex-
cluding real estate and other real property) from cash and govern-
ment securities into equity investments.  In 1980, cash or cash-like
assets168 constituted about 58% of total liquid financial assets; by 2009,
they had fallen to only 36%.169  Looking at the data another way, in
1975, U.S. households held most of their liquid assets in bank deposits
(51%), but by 2009, they held those liquid assets overwhelmingly in
“securities products” (73%).170
This reallocation means that more average investors find them-
selves in the equities market and that the stakes for them of effective
regulation are higher than they were in the past.  With personal finan-
cial stakes that much higher, we should not be surprised to find regu-
lators pursuing an increasingly stringent—or governmental—role in
order, as they see it, to more effectively vindicate investor preferences
and to ensure well-functioning markets.
3. One-Way Ratchet I: The Financial Industry
One justification for reducing the self in SROs may come from
industry participants who respond rationally to failures of the regula-
tory system.  Failures appear to trigger a one-way ratchet that increas-
ingly moves the regulatory system away from control by the industry in
the direction of government-like control.171
This phenomenon is illustrated by the selfish rationale for regula-
tion.  In a world in which investors cannot readily distinguish between
“good” and “bad” brokers before choosing one, perversely, good bro-
kers are worse off and bad brokers better off.  But if good brokers can
somehow differentiate themselves in advance, they can charge more
for their services.  This discrimination might be hard to effectuate
167 SEC data also show an increase in equity trading from $2,590,422 in 1991 to
$61,146,333 in 2010, which is an increase of 2360.5%. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SELECT SEC
AND MARKET DATA 31 (2011).
168 “Cash or cash-like assets” includes bank deposits, U.S. government securities, and
money-market funds.
169 FED. RESERVE, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 101 tbl. L.213
(2013), available at www.federalreserve.gov/releases/Z1/20130307/.
170 See id.
171 See Joel Seligman, Cautious Evolution or Perennial Irresolution: Stock Market Self-Regula-
tion During the First Seventy Years of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 59 BUS. LAW. 1347,
1348 (2004) (“Most SEC and congressional reviews of stock market self-regulation have
occurred when stock market discipline has broken down.  Often when this has occurred
there were attempts to strengthen stock market self-regulation by reducing the conflicts of
interest inherent in an industry disciplining itself.”).
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without a neutral third party to serve as a credible source of enforcing
regulations that distinguish between the two.
For members of a particular industry, then, there are powerful
incentives to oversee a self-regulatory system that works even in the
absence of government.172  Indeed, in the historical developments we
have seen in this country’s financial system, the eighteenth century
witnessed just such a confluence of incentives for financiers to self-
regulate.173  Such a system is, of course, highly dependent on the
credibility of its enforcement system.  If would-be customers believe
that the regulatory threat is not serious but rather motivated by other
goals (such as protecting an industry of bad brokers from more seri-
ous external regulation), then the entire premise of self-regulation
will be undermined.  In such a case, the value of regulation is lost,
since the good brokers can no longer credibly distinguish themselves
from bad brokers.
Such a negative perception might increase over time even if the
SRO is very effective at policing the market and disciplining bad bro-
kers.  Assume, for instance, that a given SRO is 95% effective and,
given the costs of regulation, this level of regulation is an efficient
one.  Assume further that the remaining 5% of cases that result in
fraud attract greater publicity and generate more political outrage
than the corresponding positive coverage generated by the 95% of
cases of effective regulation.  If such an imbalance of coverage exists,
as anecdotal impressions of media reports suggest, then customers
may believe the level of fraud is much higher than 5%.174
In that case, the rational policy for good brokers might be to in-
crease the distance between the regulator and the regulated—that is,
to sacrifice some of the “self” from the self-regulatory model to in-
crease the credibility of the claim that the regulation is neutral and
constructed to police bad conduct.  A promise to operate subject to
172 See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Self and Self-Regulation: Resolving the SRO Identity Crisis, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 317, 320 (2007) (“The most basic self-regulatory function
might be deemed mutual regulation, or the regulation of transactions among members
through rules that ‘foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in regulat-
ing, clearing, settling, processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions
in securities.’” (quoting Order Granting Approval of a Proposed Rule Change Amending
Rule 180 to Require Member Organizations to Use the Automated Liability Notification
System of a Registered Clearing Agency, 72 Fed. Reg. 3896 (Jan. 26, 2007))).
173 Similarly, regarding the self-regulatory feature of the financial industry, William
Cary remarks that “with the profit motive at the root of our economic system, regulation of
the industry in the interest of the public cannot be left exclusively to the practitioners,
public-spirited as they may be.” WILLIAM L. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES
44 (1967).
174 See Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy, supra note 6, at 530 (“It frequently is R
noted that [SEC] agency staffs rarely are rewarded for successes such as the anticipation
and prevention of a problem or the efficient balance of costs and benefits of a particular
rule, but [are] inevitably blamed for publicly observed failures within their jurisdictions.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 35  1-NOV-13 7:02
2013] BECOMING A FIFTH BRANCH 35
government regulation may be more compelling than one to have the
industry regulate itself.  If so, then perceived failures of regulation
(whether or not actual failures) will tend to increase the govern-
mentalization of an SRO and push it more toward becoming a QGO.
The industry might win greater deterrence value by fully moving
to a government regulator, since presumably the SEC as regulator
sends a more powerful signal about the policing of the industry than
any SRO or even QGO could.  But this consideration must be weighed
against the reluctance of Congress to fund such an expansion and any
efficiency savings from relying upon an SRO in the first place.175  In
other words, the credibility of the regulator as a neutral enforcer of
rules is just one factor that helps to explain the scope and nature of
the SRO.  The point of the one-way ratchet is simply that whatever the
equilibrium position is at a given time in terms of the choice between
government and SRO, the inevitable failures of an SRO regulator
(even if efficient) may have a rational tendency to push the industry
toward favoring a regulator that looks more like the government.
4. One-Way Ratchet II: The Financial Regulator
A similar dynamic may also be at work within the regulatory
agency overseeing any SRO.  The successes and failures of the
self-regulatory process may also accumulate over time in a way that
biases the locus of regulatory authority toward government or
government-like conduct.  If SRO successes in preventing or reducing
the costs of misconduct are relatively less politically salient than SRO
failures, then the SRO will face one-sided pressure to change its ap-
proach to regulation from government overseers.
To illustrate this version of the one-way ratchet, consider an SRO
that has one hundred regulated activities and wants to design a regula-
tory system to maximize the efficiency of the regulation (that is, to
achieve the highest social welfare at the lowest regulatory cost).  The
SRO has two options.  Option 1 is a characteristic SRO approach, im-
posing a regulatory cost of $1 per activity, a chance of failure of 20%,
and a cost of failure of $1000.  Option 2 is a more governmental ap-
proach, imposing a regulatory cost of $3 per activity, a chance of fail-
ure of 10%, and a cost of failure of $1000.  If the SRO were deciding
in a vacuum which regulatory option to use, it might choose Option 1;
the additional cost of using Option 2 ($200 in additional regulatory
costs) are greater than the expected benefits of reduced failure from
Option 2 ($100 in lower expected losses from failure).  But if the po-
litical bodies overseeing the SRO fully internalize the expected losses
175 See Karmel, supra note 18, at 155 (noting that outsourcing raises constitutional ac- R
countability issues at a time when governmental functions are continually being
privatized).
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but not the expected regulatory costs, then the calculation might be
different.  Imagine, for example, that the political costs of a public
failure of a regulated entity are three times the dollar amount at stake
while all other factors remain the same as in the example above.  In
such a case, from the perspective of the political superiors, the bene-
fits of moving to Option 2 are $300 while the costs are only $200.  The
SRO would therefore face pressure to adopt Option 2 even though it
is the less efficient regulatory approach.
Several features of the SRO model may make this one-directional
migration likely.  SROs do not enjoy full and independent control of
their regulatory authority but rather now exist as subordinate agents
of the governmental entities that ultimately control their activities.176
Congress is the source of all regulations, though it has specifically cre-
ated various administrative agencies to enforce statutory commands
and to promulgate additional rules for the regulation of particular
industries.  The SEC, for instance, is responsible for regulating “secur-
ities” markets,177 while the CFTC is responsible for regulating “com-
modities” markets.178  Each of these agencies, in turn, relies upon
various SROs to perform day-to-day regulatory enactment, compli-
ance, and enforcement.179
The recent failure of commodities broker MF Global provides a
possible example of the one-way regulatory ratchet.180  MF Global was
a leading commodities and securities broker, regulated by, among
176 See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (2012) (requiring registration of SROs with the SEC).
177 Established under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat.
881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–hh).
178 Established under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
179 FINRA, for example, serves as the primary SRO for securities brokers and dealers.
See About FINRA, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
FINRA writes rules for brokers and firms, though since 1975, these rules have been subject
to final approval by the SEC.  The SEC is in turn accountable, to a certain extent, to the
political branches of the federal government—Congress and the President. See Securities
Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).  In addition, FINRA conducts disciplinary proceedings, which are
appealable first to the SEC, pursuant to FINRA Rule 9370, FINRA Rules, FINRA, R. 9370
(2013), available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=
2403&element_id=607&record_id=609, and then to the federal courts, pursuant to the Se-
curities Exchange Act., 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).  For a description of FINRA’s adjudication
proceedings, see Adjudication, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/Adju
dication/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).  Congress therefore enjoys tremendous influence
over this entire process, since it controls funding for the various agencies, produces legisla-
tion governing all the parties, and wields subpoena power to compel adherence to its
desires.
180 See generally Ronald Filler, OMG!  What Did MF Global Do?, FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L.
REP., Nov. 2011, at 8 (explaining the events and transactions surrounding MF Global’s
collapse).
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others, the SRO arm of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.181  The
CFTC, the primary regulator of the commodities industry and futures
merchants, relies on this SRO structure: in essence, the CFTC out-
sources regulatory oversight to the exchanges, including CME, which
serve as the markets in which brokers operate.  This delegation re-
lieves the CFTC from having to examine the brokers directly.182  The
MF Global failure, however, has raised criticisms of this
arrangement.183
MF Global made a large ($6.3 billion) but disastrously incorrect
bet on European sovereign debt that drove the firm into a hasty bank-
ruptcy.184  As the firm approached insolvency, about $1.6 billion in
customer funds disappeared.185  When facts surfaced suggesting that
MF Global used this customer money, which CME is charged with en-
suring remains segregated from the firm’s proprietary funds, to try to
shore up the firm’s finances, the incident created a political firestorm.
Congressional committees convened numerous hearings, the former
head of the FBI was appointed trustee of MF Global, and countless
ongoing lawsuits and investigations were launched.186
This incident caused the CFTC to conduct a wholesale review of
the way in which futures brokers, such as MF Global, are regulated.187
Both Republican and Democratic commissioners on the CFTC made
public statements suggesting the SRO model failed in the MF Global
case.  Bart Chilton, a Democratic commissioner, said: “I think we’ve
gone too far in allowing the exchanges to be so self-regulatory that it’s
obfuscated the need for the cop to be on the beat all the time.”188
Similarly, Scott O’Malia, a Republican commissioner, said: “The MF
Global collapse was a huge broken window in the [CFTC’s] neighbor-
hood.  To restore public confidence and to deter future violations . . .
[the CFTC] needs to continue taking action.”189  These comments
and the CFTC’s response no doubt have been influenced by strong
181 See Ben Protess & Aza Ahmed, MF Global Inquiry Turns to Its Primary Regulator, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2012, at B1.
182 This is permissible under 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(C)(v)(III) (2012).
183 See Christopher Doering, MF Global Triggers Regulatory Rethink at CFTC, REUTERS
(Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/01/us-mfglobal-cftc-policy-idUS
TRE8102IV20120201/.
184 See Report of the Trustee’s Investigation and Recommendations at 5–15, In re MF
Global, Inc., No. 11-2790, 2012 WL 2002765 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2012).
185 See id. at 2–3.
186 158 CONG. REC. D389 (Apr. 24, 2012) (“Committee [on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs] concluded a hearing to examine the collapse of MF Global . . . .”); 158
CONG. REC. D308 (Mar. 27, 2012) (“Senate agreed to S. Res. 407, expressing the sense of
the Senate that executives of the bankrupt firm MF Global should not be rewarded with
bonuses while customer money is still missing.”).
187 See Doering, supra note 183. R
188 Id.
189 Id.
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pressure on Capitol Hill.  Leading congressional Republicans and
Democrats have used the incident to call for greater oversight by the
CFTC of regulated entities, as well as for enhanced procedures by
SROs to protect customer funds.  For instance, Senator Pat Roberts, a
Republican from Kansas, used the failure of MF Global to denounce
the CFTC in congressional hearings, demanding an accounting on be-
half of “folks in Kansas . . . [who] have been severely damaged eco-
nomically by the actions . . . of MF global [sic].”190  In numerous
hearings and in countless news and opinion pieces, the CFTC has
been severely criticized for its failure to ensure that MF Global’s cus-
tomers were not harmed.
CME, however, has argued that it did everything it could reasona-
bly do to prevent the collapse of MF Global.  In economic terms, the
CME argument is that its regulation was efficient even though it failed
to detect this particular allegation of fraud.  According to CME, exam-
iners from its SRO audited MF Global’s accounts in the days before
the firm’s bet on European debt went bad and found that the cus-
tomer fund accounts were overcollateralized by $200 million.191  CME
has defended the SRO approach, arguing that MF Global duped regu-
lators and that no amount of reasonable oversight could have pre-
vented those who wanted to break the rules from doing so.192  For
instance, CME points to an e-mail it sent to the general counsel of MF
Global the day before several hundred million dollars in customer
funds were illegally moved out of a customer account and used to pay
down a collateral call from a British unit of JP Morgan.  The e-mail
commanded that “effective immediately, any equity withdrawals . . .
must be approved in writing by CME.”193  But CME did not learn of
the nearly $200 million moved offshore to JP Morgan until three days
after the transfer.194
Whether or not the SRO model was to blame for the violation of
segregation rules in the MF Global case seems to be a minor factor
relative to the political pressure the CFTC faces to reform in the wake
of the event.  If the CFTC is going to be blamed for the MF Global
failure, it is more likely to try to reform the regulatory process to exert
more direct control.  Furthermore, if successes are not celebrated in a
190 Ronald D. Orol, Senators Target CFTC over MF Global Failure, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 1,
2011), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-12-01/economy/30788017_1_mf-global-
commodity-futures-trading-commission-customer-funds.
191 See Terrence Duffy, CME Chief Speaks Out on C.F.T.C. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Jan. 11, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/11/cme-chief-speaks-out-on-c-f-t-
c-inquiry/.
192 See id.
193 Aaron Lucchetti & Julie Steinberg, MF Response to CME Edict Probed, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304177104577312073
753226142.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
194 Id.
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manner proportional to the way in which failures are denounced,
then the forces will inevitably privilege a more governmental form of
regulation, even if that approach may not be the most efficient regula-
tory approach.
Perception therefore may appear to matter more than reality in
this system.195  Even if the SRO model is more efficient at reducing
risk for a given expenditure on regulation, if average investors believe
a more governmental approach is better, then government will have
an incentive to make the SRO look more like government.  Markets
work in significant part because of trust and confidence, and there-
fore the perception about regulation may be as or more important
than a purely mechanistic cost-benefit analysis that excludes market
perception.196
The power of investor beliefs, as channeled through politicians
acting for both the interests of their constituents and for themselves,
is complicated by the diffusion of accountability inherent in the SRO
approach.  We consider this factor next.
5. Misguided Accountability
The lack of direct accountability on the part of various political
actors who oversee financial SROs may also drive those SROs toward
governmentalization.  In short, if regulators, such as the commission-
ers of administrative agencies like the SEC and CFTC that oversee
SROs, are politically blamed whether or not they are involved directly
in regulating a failed entity, then they will necessarily prefer a greater
direct role in regulating the entity in question.  There are several rea-
sons why this might be true.
For one, greater control may mean less risk in the eyes of the
ultimate accountable authority.  The presence of agency costs means
that the principal regulator (e.g., the SEC) will be concerned that its
agent (e.g., FINRA) will act in a way that maximizes the agent’s wel-
fare instead of the principal’s.  Therefore, the principal will take steps
to ensure alignment, including monitoring, incentives, and punish-
ments;197 the agent may also take steps to prevent excessive involve-
ment by the principal in the form of various bonding mechanisms.
All of these dynamics will increase as the expected costs of regulatory
195 See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral
Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135, 165–66 (2002).
196 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law in the Twenty-First Century, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1289, 1291
(2011) (“‘With few exceptions, trust is essential to economic prosperity. . . .’  The benefits
of trusting are accompanied by the risks of abuse of trust and the costs of self-protection
from such abuse.” (quoting TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CUL-
TURE AT A CROSSROAD 49 (2006))).
197 At the very least, under U.S. Securities and Exchange Act Rule 17a-5, FINRA must
submit an annual audit report to the SEC.  17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (2013).
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failure (crudely, the probability of failure times the costs of failure)
increase.  In other words, a greater potential downside will cause the
principal to spend more time and money monitoring the agent to en-
sure faithful agency.  Even so, when the ultimate accountability for
failure resides with the principal and not the agent, the locus of deci-
sion-making authority will also eventually shift to the principal as well.
The more the blame falls on the principal, the more control it may
seek to exercise.
This migration is the insight of economist Kenneth Arrow, who
described the trade-off between accountability and authority, noting
that accountability
must be capable of correcting errors but should not be such as to
destroy the genuine values of authority.  Clearly, a sufficiently strict
and continuous organ of [accountability] can easily amount to a
denial of authority.  If every decision of A is to be reviewed by B,
then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B
and hence no solution to the original problem.198
Accountability and authority are in tension, and the more one party
bears the costs of failure, the more that party will assert its authority.
The MF Global story told above may provide support for the exis-
tence of this factor as well.  MF Global was overseen by numerous reg-
ulators in the various parts of its business, none of which was
responsible for the firm’s entire business.199  But when MF Global de-
clared bankruptcy, it was the CFTC that received the most blame.
Members of both parties repeatedly grilled CFTC Chair Gary Gensler
and other agency officials about the missing $1.6 billion.200  Though
the actual locus of regulatory failure may have been elsewhere—or,
indeed, nonexistent—the political pressure landed most heavily on
the CFTC.  Accordingly, the CFTC exerted its authority to take com-
mand of the investigation of the incident, which had previously been
conducted by CME, MF Global’s most direct, though not its sole, regu-
lator.  CME’s executive chairman, Terrence Duffy, described the pro-
cess this way: “In November, the C.F.T.C. requested that CME Group
not conduct its own investigation, but rather take part in the agency’s
inquiry, and since then we have worked together closely.”201  The im-
plication here is clear: if CFTC is going to be hauled before Congress
to face the risk of statutory revision or budgetary pressure for this per-
198 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 78 (1974).
199 According to media accounts, “MF Global had nearly a half dozen regulators polic-
ing various parts of the firm, but no single regulator was responsible for the whole com-
pany.”  Doering, supra note 183. R
200 See Ronald D. Orol, Lawmakers Grill CFTC Chief over Broker Failures, MARKETWATCH
(July 17, 2012), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2012-07-17/economy/32707011_1_
customer-funds-cftc-peregrine-ceo.
201 Duffy, supra note 191. R
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ceived failure of regulation, then the CFTC is going to exert greater
control over the regulation.  As noted above, the CFTC is currently
studying how to do precisely that.202
6. Public Choice I: The Regulator
Public choice theory suggests that the governmentalization of fi-
nancial SROs may also arise as a consequence of political pressures
involved in the allocation of regulatory authority.203  Assuming a regu-
lator is interested, at least in part, in maximizing its own authority and
power,204 then its first preference would be for direct control of the
regulated entities.  This arrangement, however, may not be possible
for a variety of practical reasons having to do with congressional pref-
erences about the efficacy of self-regulation or the agency in question,
the path dependence of the industry’s development, budgetary issues,
or other factors.205  As trading volumes have grown enormously (from
an average of about 300 million shares per day in 1990 to more than
10 billion shares per day in 2011),206 for instance, regulatory budgets
and resources have not kept pace.207
202 See supra notes 187–90 and accompanying text. R
203 Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy, supra note 6, at 528 (“Public choice theory R
posits that far from seeking any independent conception of the ‘public good,’ regulators
simply and rationally seek to maximize their own level of external support, and thus fre-
quently allocate wealth (in the form of regulatory subsidies and/or restraints on competi-
tion) to those groups that bid the highest in terms of such support.”); see James J. Park, The
Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 675–80 (2007); see also Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212 (1976) (“The
essential commodity being transacted in the political market is a transfer of wealth, with
constituents on the demand side and their political representatives on the supply side.
Viewed in this way, the market here, as elsewhere, will distribute more of the good to those
whose effective demand is highest.”); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–4 (1971) (proposing that, despite perceptions to the
contrary, “regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily
for its benefit”).
204 A regulator accomplishes this through such things as the scope of its oversight, its
budget, and so on.
205 The recently proposed legislation to create a new SRO for investment advisors
could be an example of this. See Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012, H.R. 4624,
112th Cong. (2012) (as introduced by Sen. Bachus); see also Mark Schoeff Jr., Bachus Bill
Backs SRO for RIAs—and It Could Be Finra, INVESTMENTNEWS (Apr. 25, 2012), http://www.
investmentnews.com/article/20120425/FREE/120429948 (discussing proposed legisla-
tion).  Although the SEC might prefer to increase its regulatory authority, it may realize
that practical constraints, such as politics or budgetary pressure, may limit this option.  The
SEC may realize this and get a second-best outcome by supporting an SRO that it is confi-
dent it can capture.
206 See US Key Stats, SIFMA (last modified Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.sifma.org/
uploadedFiles/Research/Statistics/StatisticsFiles/CM-US-Key-Stats-SIFMA.xls.
207 According to the SEC, its expenses have increased from about $285 million in 1995
to about $1 billion in 2010. See Budget History, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (last modified
June 23, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/budgetact.htm.
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Accordingly, the agency’s second-best option would be the ability
to exert greater control over its subordinate SROs.  This expanded
reach would expand the agency’s control over an industry in which it
may have certain rulemaking authority already.208  For instance, sub-
stantial SEC resources are spent on overseeing FINRA and its direct
regulation of the securities industry.209  In addition, over time, the
agency may be relatively confident that it could expand its influence
further by exercising greater authority over the SRO.  For instance,
although the blame for failures such as the Madoff scam often falls on
the SEC,210 those occasions also provide the agency with openings for
greater direct and indirect control over investment advisors.211  We
are, of course, considering a public-choice story.  The regulatory
agency, starting from a position of limited control, may use soft power
to exert more and more authority.
The history of the securities SRO offers a good example of how
the locus of regulatory control can be calibrated to reflect prevailing
political views of the time.  When the securities SRO was officially
given the government’s imprimatur by the Maloney Act of 1938, SEC
authority over the SRO—then still the NASD—was comparatively
weak.  For example, the NASD (and the SRO of the NYSE Exchange)
promulgated its own rules without much SEC review.212  This arrange-
ment was the tradition for decades.  After the back-office scandal of
the late 1960s, however, Congress increased SEC authority by adding
section 19(b) and (c) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provid-
ing that the SEC must approve all SRO rule changes and may “abro-
gate, add to, and delete from” any SRO rules.213  Then, after another
208 E.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-625, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IM-
PROVE SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY 25–27 (2012)
(recommending expanded SEC oversight of FINRA).
209 Boston Consulting Group estimated that SEC oversight of an SRO for investment
advisors would cost approximately $240 million to $270 million, whereas FINRA oversight
would cost $550 million to $610 million. See BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., INVESTMENT AD-
VISER OVERSIGHT: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS 5 (2011); see also Lisa Shidler, FINRA
Attacks Boston Consulting Group over SRO Study, RIABIZ (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.riabiz.
com/a/10363166/finra-attacks-boston-consulting-group-over-sro-study (reporting that
FINRA contests BCG Study findings).
210 See, e.g., SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, OIG-509, INVESTIGATION
OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME 456–57 (2009),
available at http://sec.gov/news/studies/2009/oig-509.pdf (“[T]here were systematic
breakdowns in the manner in which the SEC conducted its examinations and investiga-
tions . . . .”).
211 See, e.g., ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, INVESTOR AND IN-
DUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2008); SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, DIV. INV. MGMT, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2011);
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. INV. MGMT, STUDY ON ENHANCING  INVESTMENT ADVISERS EXAMI-
NATIONS (2011).
212 See S. REP. No. 94-75 (1975).
213 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012).
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scandal in the early 1990s involving industry price fixing,214 the SEC
received more oversight of the SROs, this time involving authority
over substantive changes to membership and governance.215  These
are just two examples of the way in which the regulatory agency in
question, here the SEC, has used perceived regulatory failures to exert
additional control over the SRO.  This process, as described above, is
commonly available, since failures are likely to happen from time to
time.
Note also that a similar dynamic may be occurring at a more
granular level.  Not only might the SEC as an entity covet the arroga-
tion of greater authority over its subsidiary SROs, but so too might the
officials working within those entities.  Consider, for instance, that
Mary Schapiro, the most recent chair of the SEC, was appointed to
that position from her role as chief executive officer of FINRA.216
One can readily appreciate why high-level officers of an SRO might
perceive high-level positions within the administrative agencies above
them as attractive promotions.217  History is filled with provincial gov-
ernors eager for elevation to positions within their imperial metropo-
lises.  Of course, to earn such a promotion, it certainly helps to be
perceived as willing and able to execute the sought-after office.  If one
wishes to become the head of the SEC, success might be more likely
with a more aggressive regulatory track record, even though a lower-
profile self-regulatory approach might in fact be more effective or
preferable for the subsidiary.218
What, though, of lower-level employees within these entities, who
might be more inclined to migrate from the SEC to FINRA because of
higher private-sector salaries?  Such movement might not suggest that
those officers’ goal is to make FINRA more like the SEC.  But that
migration would certainly be easier if the two entities were more simi-
lar to one another than dissimilar.  Thus, public-choice effects at the
214 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 698–701. R
215 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(3), 78o-3(b)(4).
216 SEC Biography: Chairman Mary L. Schapiro, supra note 125. R
217 Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker, supra note 6, at 1604 (“The move from division R
director (or even associate director) to private law practice is typically celebrated in the
trade press as creating immediate wealth and stature.  A frequent concern associated with
the ‘revolving door’ is that agency insiders will do the bidding of firms and their clients,
who will repay them for their loyalty later on—and there may well be truth here.”); see also
POGO STUDY, supra note 37, at 8 (between 2001 and 2010, 419 former SEC employees filed R
1949 disclosure statements saying that they planned to represent clients or new employers
in matters pending at the SEC).
218 The most recent example would be the nomination of Mary Jo White as the new
SEC Chair.  She has a record as an aggressive prosecutor (as the former U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of New York), and many already anticipate that she will be as heavy
handed in her position at the SEC. See, e.g., John Wasik, Mary Jo White: Good Cop or Bad Cop
for Wall Street?, FORBES (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2013/01/
25/mary-jo-white-good-cop-or-bad-cop-for-wall-street/.
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individual-regulator level also offer explanations for why self-regula-
tory and governmentally regulated entities would tend to converge
over time.219
7. Public Choice II: The Compliance Industry220
Another public-choice dynamic may be at work within the regu-
lated firms themselves.  If there is a powerful group within a regulated
firm that wants a more governmental form of self-regulation for its
own reasons that diverge from the interests of the firm or its custom-
ers, then it will act to enable the process of governmentalization.  Cer-
tain constituencies within a firm may prefer more regulation, more
strict or bureaucratic rules for a given amount of regulation, and so
on.  This preference may be in their interest because it enhances their
personal or group interests, because it means more interesting work,
more budgetary authority, more control, or for other reasons.  We
speculate that this dynamic may be at work in the dramatic growth of
compliance departments over the past two decades in the broker-
dealer industry.
Within each broker-dealer there is a group of individuals, known
colloquially as “compliance,” whose job it is “to supervise the day-to-
day conduct of business unit activities and to have in place policies
and procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with ap-
plicable laws and regulations.”221  Compliance typically provides the
following functions: advising business units about rules and regula-
tions, developing internal policies and procedures that help the firm
to comply with external rules, helping to train business personnel re-
garding their legal duties, helping to monitor business functions for
compliance with legal rules, conducting internal investigations, han-
dling licensing and registration of business professionals, and manag-
ing relationships with regulators.222  In all of these functions, the role
and importance of compliance, as a stand-alone function, is greater
than the amount of external regulation.  Moreover, holding the
amount of regulation constant, the more intense, complex, bureau-
cratic, and adversarial the regulation, the greater the need for effec-
219 Dombalagian, supra note 172, at 330 (“SROs, such as the NASD, are likely to be- R
have as if they are an extension of the Commission’s own compliance and enforcement
arms, with the added benefit that they are subsidized by industry fees and not constrained
by the same statutory limitations on their power.”).
220 See generally John H. Walsh, Right the First Time: Regulation, Quality, and Preventive
Compliance in the Securities Industry, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 165, 168 (arguing that private
compliance systems are “the best available means for getting compliance right the first
time”).
221 SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, WHITE PAPER ON THE ROLE OF COMPLIANCE 1 (2005), available at
http://www.sifma.org/uploadedFiles/Societies/SIFMA_Compliance_and_Legal_Society/
Role_of_Compliance_White_Paper%20(2).pdf.
222 Id. at 3–6.
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tive compliance.223  In other words, whether compliance personnel
are designing training programs, offering advice to business units, or
handling internal audits, their importance within the firm is propor-
tional to the governmental nature of the external regulation.  Where
the regulation is aggressive, high risk, adversarial, and “other” in a
sense, compliance is a more vital function than when the regulation is
less so.  Compliance experts are generally relied upon more under
government regulation rather than under self-regulation.224
Notwithstanding this implicit preference for more govern-
ment-like regulation, compliance operates within a firm and therefore
must operate within the constraints set by the firm.  In other words,
firms may recognize this tendency and exert pressure for compliance
to be structured and act in a way that privileges the interests of the
firm (which may favor more self-regulatory regulation) over the inter-
ests of a particular department.225
For several reasons, compliance departments may be successful at
breaching their firms’ constraints in the long term.
First, compliance professionals are typically siloed in the organiza-
tional structure from the rest of the firm’s business to ensure that bus-
iness interests or short-term profit motives do not corrupt the firm’s
internal regulatory processes.226  One industry white paper, for in-
stance, describes as a best practice “separating [c]ompliance
[d]epartment functions from the supervisory functions of line manag-
ers, as well as distinguishing the roles of the [c]ompliance
223 For example, FINRA Rule 3130 requires registration of each member firm’s chief
compliance officer; FINRA has brought enforcement actions against individuals serving in
this regard where they fail to adequately ensure compliance with relevant regulations such
as FINRA Rule 3310 (requiring an anti-money laundering compliance program). See Dan
Jamieson, Finra Zeroes in on Money-Laundering Cases, INVESTMENT NEWS (Jan. 6, 2013), http:/
/www.investmentnews.com/article/20130106/REG/301069985#; FINRA Rules, supra note
179, R. 3130, 3310. R
224 See Mary Ann Gadziala, Assoc. Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examina-
tions, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Bond Market Association’s Ninth Annual
Legal and Compliance: The Vital Role of Effective Comprehensive Compliance Controls at
Broker-Dealers (Feb. 4, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020404mag.htm.
225 See Paul F. Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before
the Investment Council Association of America: Meeting the Compliance Challenge (Apr.
23, 1999), available at www.404.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch271.htm
(“[C]ompliance officers must be accorded proper respect within the organization and
have sufficient authority to do their jobs, and to remedy inappropriate conduct.  Ask your
compliance personnel whether they feel they have this authority. . . .  Do your compliance
personnel feel comfortable going straight to top management, if necessary?  Are there
both formal and informal lines of communication between the compliance department
and top management?”).
226 See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compli-
ance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 93 (“If either the compensation scheme or the
internal culture causes the monitors to see themselves as interested in firm profitability as
much as (or more than) good compliance, then self-serving biases will come into play and
compromise the success of the oversight.”).
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[d]epartment from other control functions.”227  The logic here is
powerful since the overlap of regulated and regulator in a particular
firm may give the firm less credibility with external regulators in the
event of an investigation of the firm.  Note, however, that the compli-
ance subcommittee of the industry trade group, called the Securities
Industry Association, wrote this white paper.  As such, this position
might simply be an effort by the compliance professionals to entrench
their interests and to protect themselves from the scrutiny of the
broader business.  In either case, compliance is isolated as a stand-
alone department.  From such a position, compliance may be able to
define and to exert its interests more easily than integrated depart-
ments within a firm.  If compliance heads in a direction the rest of the
business finds troubling, the ability to control it may be limited by
concern about interfering—or appearing to interfere—with legal
obligations.228
Second, the actions of compliance are likely difficult and costly for
business managers to monitor.229  Compliance is largely a legal func-
tion, and typical business managers in a broker-dealer firm do not
possess similar training or experience.  Compliance employees may
use their specialty knowledge, the unique nomenclature and patois of
law, or unfamiliarity with legal process to insulate their work from rig-
orous business oversight.230  The mantra of compliance profession-
als—to create and foster a culture of compliance—is consistent with
this account.231  “Culture” is a particularly malleable and powerful ex-
227 SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 221, at 2. R
228 Director of Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations Carlo V. di Florio
understands conflicts of interests to mean
a scenario where a person or firm has an incentive to serve one interest at
the expense of another interest or obligation.  This might mean serving the
interest of the firm over that of a client, or serving the interest of one client
over other clients, or an employee or group of employees serving their own
interests over those of the firm or its clients.
Carlo V. di Florio, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Speech at National Society of Compliance Professionals: Conflicts of Interest and
Risk Governance (Oct. 22, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch
103112cvd.htm.
229 Langevoort, supra note 226, at 83–90 (discussing the difficulties of direct monitor- R
ing and explaining that perfect compliance with the law is not a reasonable expectation).
230 Incentivizing compliance may encourage production, but it can also function as a
conflict of interest. See Lori Richards, Former Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the 2008 Willamette Securities Regulation
Conference: Incentivizing Good Compliance (Oct. 30, 2008), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/speech/2008/spch103008lar.htm. See generally DAVID CALLAHAN, THE CHEATING
CULTURE (2004) (examining the role of economic shifts in incentivizing cheating in busi-
ness, schools, and key professionals).
231 Roye, supra note 225 (“[T]he first step in creating an effective compliance system is R
selecting and empowering the right people.  For a firm to have a strong compliance cul-
ture, it must start at the top.  If not, why should lower level employees take compliance
seriously?”); see also Prudential-Bache Secur., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-22755, 48
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planation for a range of activities.  Any pushback on a “culture of com-
pliance,” as defined by compliance, can be countered with concerns
about legality and a FINRA rulebook that is, as of the 2012 printing,
1374 pages of eight-point font.
Such factors as these might still not permit an overly indepen-
dent compliance department, however, if business managers of bro-
ker-dealers found it worthwhile to invest in disciplining compliance
departments, but there is little reason for a rational firm to do so.232
For one, the compliance departments at all broker-dealers face the
same incentives to influence outsiders setting the rules of the game,
and therefore disciplining only one department would likely have lit-
tle impact.  A common effort by all or a critical mass of broker-dealers
would be necessary but difficult to organize and perhaps subject to
antitrust constraints.
Another reason firms are unlikely to try to counter the move to-
ward greater complexity and governmentalization is that all similarly
situated broker-dealers face the same increased cost as a result of the
change, and therefore no individual broker-dealer would reap any ad-
vantage from halting the trend.233  All other firms would benefit freely
through such efforts, and therefore no firm has an incentive to invest
in countering the push because of the free-rider problem.234  Instead,
broker-dealers reasonably may perceive increased compliance costs as
an industry-wide tax, which they can likely pass on to their custom-
ers.235  Any such burden applies to every broker-dealer, and
broker-dealers have a monopoly on executing stock transactions.  So
long as the firm keeps compliance costs within the range of competi-
S.E.C. 372, 401 (Jan. 2, 1986) (“A broker-dealer is not meeting its supervisory obligations
under the federal securities laws if its Compliance Department can be disregarded or oth-
erwise rendered ineffective by a branch manager.”).
232 Langevoort, supra note 226, at 86 (“Common sense suggests that discovering a com- R
pliance risk is unpleasant and hence aversive, especially if the employee is also a friend.
The agent must often be confronted, putting at risk the loyalty and trust bonds that other-
wise have been built.  In settings of high ambiguity, there will often be innocent explana-
tions, so that these confrontations have no positive payoff and lingering damage.  In the
face of this, people tend to interpret data in a way that avoids aversive inference, subcon-
sciously giving the agent an excessive benefit of the doubt.”).
233 For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis in the context of compliance, see Vincent
di Lorenzo, Does the Law Encourage Unethical Conduct in the Securities Industry?, 11 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 765, 782–94 (2006).
234 The POGO Study shows that large firms are able to leverage their relationship with
regulators to evade detrimental consequences of potential enforcement action; large firms
are further incentivized to benefit as free riders of common practices with the SEC. See
POGO STUDY, supra note 37, at 8–14. R
235 Marianne K. Smythe, Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry
and the Antitrust Laws: Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 477 n.10
(1984).
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tive firms, there is no business disadvantage, no matter how much
compliance costs.236
One final point is worth mentioning.  For large broker-dealers,
not only are compliance costs of little harm (if they amount to an
industry-wide tax), but they may be valuable.  If the compliance indus-
try generates a demand for compliance services that has a large fixed
cost per firm, then large firms can use this “culture of compliance” as
a way to reduce the profit of smaller rivals or to create barriers for new
entrants.237  Larger firms can spread any fixed costs over a larger asset
base and therefore bear any costs more easily than a smaller firm.  As-
sume, for example, two firms, one with 100 customers at the firm with
$100 each, and another firm with 50 customers with $100 each.  Fur-
ther assume compliance costs are $50, plus $2 per customer.  In that
case, total compliance costs for the first firm would be $250 and $150
for the second firm.  As a percentage of assets under management,
however, the first firm’s compliance costs are just 2.5% while the sec-
ond firm’s are 3%.  If the firms pass on the costs to their customer, the
second firm will have to outperform the first firm by 50 basis points to
offer competitive services.
Another source of potential competitive advantage exists from
the development of a culture of compliance.  In a business environ-
ment in which returns from investment strategies are increasingly
commodified and asset managers have greater difficulty differentiat-
ing themselves, regulatory adroitness can itself be a source of competi-
tive advantage.  Perversely, for firms that are particularly expert at
compliance, the larger the burden and complexity of regulation, the
better.  A firm with a 10% cost advantage on legal compliance can
differentiate itself more if compliance costs are, on average, $1000 per
firm rather than if they are merely $100 per firm.
Importantly, this observation does not imply or require any con-
scious plan on the part of any individual.  The process by which inter-
est groups protect their interests, expand their influence, and pursue
goals narrowly, while being integrated into a larger whole, is well de-
scribed in the public-choice literature, and it does not require deliber-
ate action.  Rather, these developments may occur unintentionally in
a manner difficult to observe or to counter in any individual case but
with substantial consequences nevertheless.
Anecdotal evidence about the compliance industry corroborates
such observations.  Compliance as a separate function began in the
1960s.238  Before this time, compliance with rules and regulations was
236 For another application of this argument, see generally M. Todd Henderson, Justi-
fying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027 (2010).
237 See SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 32, at 2–5. R
238 Id. at 1.
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the responsibility of each professional broker.  Although this is still
true, the responsibility is now shared with a separate department fo-
cused entirely on rules.239  Over the next three decades or so, the
compliance industry remained relatively small, with even the largest
broker-dealers employing only a few individuals devoted to a separate
compliance function.  In part, this kind of slow growth can simply be
explained by a rise in the size of the typical firm and the increasing
complexity of its operations.  But, according to interviews with compli-
ance officers at large broker-dealers, starting in the mid-1990s, the
number of compliance officers began to boom.  At one large broker-
dealer, just a handful of compliance officers worked in 1995, while
today there are over four hundred individuals.240  The timing of this
explosion corresponds quite well with our account of the increasing
governmentalization of the SROs for broker-dealers.  The thrust of
our argument in this section is simply that this temporal confluence is
not a coincidence but rather that the governmentalization has been
driven in part by the private interests of “compliance” within and
across firms, and that this growth creates a feedback loop in which the
process of governmentalization increases over time.  Putting aside is-
sues of initial causality, once the process starts, increasing govern-
mentalization begets more demand for compliance, which in turn
fosters an interest in more rules and more government-like process.
Given the importance of this feedback loop, as in other areas where
feedback is important, the growth of compliance is unlikely to remain
linear.  And, in practice, we appear to be witnessing more explosive
growth.
8. Industry Structure
A final potential influence on the nature and scope of SRO regu-
lation is any change in industry structure.  The nature of the underly-
ing regulated industry will influence the shape of its self-regulatory
structure, which will in turn influence the relationship with the gov-
ernment regulator.  A consolidated industry structure, coupled with a
single SRO, is likely to lead to a different position vis-a`-vis the ultimate
government regulator than a more diffuse industry with multiple com-
peting SROs.241  In other words, the nature of SROs is likely to reflect
the fundamental industry structure.
239 See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Ex-
change Act Release No. 26,299, 81 SEC Docket 2775, (Dec. 17, 2003) (implementing new
rules that require each investment company and adviser to adopt written compliance poli-
cies and designate a chief compliance officer to administer those policies).
240 Cf. SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 32, at 3 (noting the estimated cost for compliance R
by the securities industry to be more than $25 billion in 2005).
241 See Park, supra note 41, at 120–29. R
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For example, the government agency may enjoy more control
over a single SRO, since it can devote all of its attention to it; the
government agency might have more at stake if there is a single SRO
and therefore exert more influence on it; the government agency and
the single SRO might work more closely together, and therefore the
SRO might come to look more governmental; and so forth.
On the other hand, one can imagine that with fewer options for
exit to different SROs, and therefore a greater stake in the policies of
a single SRO, industry members might have a greater stake in optimiz-
ing the SRO’s policies to meet their needs.  While one might think
this influence would be in the direction of a more pure self-regulatory
model, the discussion above suggests this is not necessarily true.  For
instance, the public-choice analysis of the compliance industry sug-
gests that even firms that might otherwise initially prefer an SRO
model might come to prefer a QGO over time.  Although  it is not
entirely clear which way a change in industry structure cuts without
more information, consolidation is likely to lead to greater govern-
mentalization when combined with the factors mentioned above.242
Over the past several decades, there has been significant consoli-
dation in the securities and commodities industry.  While a full
description of this history is beyond the scope of this Article, the point
can be made with some basic facts.  There has been consolidation of
the major stock exchanges, with the NYSE, NASDAQ, and CME Group
buying rivals and building international dominance.243  The SROs
have consolidated as well, with the most prominent example being the
combination in 2007 of the NASD (the regulator for over-the-counter
securities transactions) and the SRO of the NYSE merging to create a
single securities regulator known as FINRA.244  A final example of this
trend is the recent congressional command in the Dodd-Frank Act
that certain derivatives transactions be conducted on centralized
clearinghouses.245  In all these cases, the trend has been toward more
consolidation and centralization, which has the effect of pushing to-
242 See generally Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV.
775 (2006) (arguing that substantial federal government regulation of securities transac-
tions in the United States will continue and intensify).
243 See, e.g., Joseph P. Borg, President of the N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, NASAA State-
ment on Consolidation of Securities Industry SROs (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.nasaa.
org/7598/nasaa-statement-on-consolidation-of-securities-industry-sros/; see also John C.
Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition
on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1759–60 (2002) (stating that
improved communication and transportation led to the consolidation or shuttering of
many exchanges).
244 See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Consolidation of NASD
and NYSE, 72 Fed. Reg. 42,169, 42,170–42,174 (July 26, 2007).
245 See Silla Brush, CFTC Proposes Swaps Clearing Determinations Under Dodd-Frank, BLOOM-
BERG (July 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-25/cftc-proposes-swaps-
clearing-determinations-under-dodd-frank-1-.html.
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ward a more governmentalized approach to self-regulation under the
reasonable assumptions described above.
B. Implications for Other SROs
The mechanisms that transform SROs into QGOs are not neces-
sarily applicable in every case, nor can they be applied mechanisti-
cally.  The facts and circumstances for particular industries and SROs
will determine whether particular mechanisms influence the nature
and scope of regulation, whether a mechanism or a combination of
mechanisms transform an SRO into a QGO, and how quickly any such
transformation will occur.
In the commodities industry, for instance, we have described
some instances in which governmentalization seems to be occurring,
but there may be other factors at work that do not support or even
counteract such a transformation.  For instance, while the securities
business has become more of a retail business in which larger num-
bers of average individuals are betting greater amounts in an interme-
diated way, the commodities and derivatives markets do not clearly
reflect a similar evolution.  Obviously, derivatives have seen huge re-
cent growth: the total notional value of all derivatives rose from $88
trillion at the end of 1999 to an astonishing $633 trillion by the end of
2009.246  But there is no good evidence to suggest that retail investors
have driven this growth as they have in the case of equities.  This dif-
ference might suggest less pressure to move to a QGO model in
derivatives.
Of course, the commodities industry’s dramatic increase in size
alone might suggest more systemic risks, which may in turn generate
more demand for government-like regulation.  The Dodd-Frank Act’s
treatment of derivatives is perhaps one example of this sentiment.  In
addition, a lesson of the 2008 financial crisis may be that average in-
vestors are not the only ones who may need the protections of law.247
Thus, the mere growth of the industry may be a factor favoring a more
governmental approach to regulation.
246 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, A Preliminary Staff Report on Deriviatives Has
Been Submitted to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, FED. BANKING L. REP. ¶96-962, 2010
WL 7364618 (June 29, 2010)  (“The volume and variety of derivatives trading have grown
dramatically over the past two decades.  Global over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives grew
seven-fold from $88 trillion in notional amount outstanding ($2.63 trillion in gross market
value) at the end of 1999 to $615 trillion notional amount outstanding ($21.6 trillion gross
market value) at the end of 2009.”).  The derivative market continued to grow after 2009,
rising to a total notional value of $639 trillion at the end of 2012. See BANK FOR INT’L
SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-DECEMBER 2012 1
(2013), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1305.pdf.
247 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing institutional and individual financial victims).
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Another element to consider is the relation between the evolu-
tion of various SROs across industries.  The evolution of the SRO in
the securities industry from SRO to QGO might, for instance, make a
similar change in the commodities industry more likely.248  If FINRA
is viewed as a model for SROs, as its prominent position among them
sometimes suggests, then as it changes, so too might other financial
SROs.249  For instance, if an SRO in another industry, such as com-
modities or derivatives, experiences a regulatory failure, whether or
not the SRO was efficient ex ante, then the baseline comparison in
terms of regulatory approach will be with other leading SROs, like
FINRA.  Again, perception here may matter more than the provable
linkage between structure and outcomes.  Furthermore, as FINRA be-
comes more like the SEC, the agency may use that transformation as
an example for other financial industries to follow.
Based on our conjectures, we believe that the process of govern-
mentalization is likely for other financial SROs.  Of course, we cannot
be certain when such a transformation will happen, how fast it will
occur, or what the primary impetus will be for the change, but our
prediction is that these factors are a powerful influence on financial
SROs.
III
IMPLICATIONS OF INCREASING GOVERNMENTALIZATION
In the previous two Parts of this Article, we first detailed the phe-
nomenon of a growing governmentalization of financial self-regula-
tory organizations and then explored the mechanisms that appear
most responsible for that transformation.  In this Part, we consider the
implications of increasing governmentalization of the SROs in our
federal administrative structure.
Certainly, in light of the performance and popular depiction of
the U.S. and global financial markets over the past several years, some
commentators may welcome any development that appears to in-
crease the power of financial regulators, no matter what form it may
248 Certainly, regulation of accountants and auditors has moved towards a greater de-
gree of government control.  Oversight changed from a peer-review system to that of a
government function when Sarbanes-Oxley authorized the PCAOB. See Robert B. Thomp-
son, The SEC After the Financial Meltdown: Social Control over Finance?, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 567,
575 n.34 (2010) (citing Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekabo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB
and Its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 979, 1014–18 (2005)).
249 A discussion of regulatory competition may be relevant when considering the fail-
ures of one industry’s regulatory body. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolida-
tion: The Significance of Organizational Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS.
LAW. 447, 470–73 (1995) (observing that overlapping agency jurisdiction can lead to com-
petition but concluding that inefficiency and collusion may be more likely).
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take.250  There is no shortage of critics of financial regulation gener-
ally and self-regulation specifically, many of whom prescribe just such
a greater role for governmental actors.
Indeed, the new millennium’s opening decade featured a series
of high-profile financial scandals and failures: from the hangover of
the bursting dot-commery, to the Enron and WorldCom accounting
investigations to mutual fund market timing allegations, to the mort-
gage meltdown and its accompanying 2008 global financial crisis.
Each of these cycles fostered public hand-wringing, prosecutorial in-
vestigations, and federal regulatory responses.  Following several de-
cades in which the original four securities statutes of the Great
Depression dominated the legal landscape, the past ten years alone
has given rise to several new landmark laws: Sarbanes-Oxley,251 Dodd-
Frank,252 and the JOBS Act.253  State financial regulators, too, have
grown increasingly active in their investigation of financial dealings:
then–New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer gained renown as the
Sheriff of Wall Street;254 today, his successor, Eric Schneiderman, is
investigating major financial institutions for their role in the mortgage
debacle.255
Given this widespread and popular support for new investiga-
tions, new legislation, and new regulations to police financial behav-
ior, we would fully expect at least some constituencies to applaud any
increased governmentalization of financial self-regulatory organiza-
tions.  In fact, to the extent some commentators may have believed
SROs to be intrinsically feeble institutions dominated by their mem-
bers, this development may appear simply to be the necessary and ob-
vious corrective to an inept original design.256
250 See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 129–34
(2005).  Although Professor Karmel’s article discusses specifically corporate governance
and not generally securities, it serves as an example of the SEC’s tendency towards more
and more aggressive regulation in other industries.
251 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
252 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
253 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § § 77d-1 (2012)).
254 See Adi Ignatius, Eliot Spitzer: Wall Street’s Top Cop, TIME MAG. (Dec. 30, 2002), http:/
/www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003960,00.html.
255 See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, 2 Big Banks Face Suits in Mortgage Pact Abuses, N.Y.
TIMES DEALBOOK (May 6, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/new-york-to-
sue-bank-of-america-and-wells-fargo-over-settlement-violations/?ref=erictschneiderman.
256 For example, see the proposed SRO for investment advisers under the Investment
Adviser Oversight Act of 2012, H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. (2012) (as introduced by Sen.
Bachus).
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But we urge caution about the increasingly powerful and govern-
mental SROs.  The implications of this evolution are troublesome, no
matter what one’s disposition towards the regulation of financial mar-
kets.  Certainly, those who would prefer fewer governmental con-
straints upon the financial markets are necessarily going to be
disappointed with a significant increase in those constraints.  But even
those who welcome new financial legislation should not embrace
greater SRO governmentalization as a self-evident good without con-
sidering what will be lost by the de facto elimination of true self-regu-
lation in our financial markets.
We see at least three significant concerns with ever-increasing
governmentalization.
First, the loss of self-regulation prompts a recollection of what the
benefits of self-regulation are and why the financial SROs were estab-
lished in the first instance.  Congress had compelling reasons to per-
mit self-regulation to coexist with—rather than to be replaced by—
governmental regulatory authorities such as the SEC and CFTC.
Second, commensurability in our system of regulatory authority is
a compelling consideration: there are persuasive reasons to deploy
softer power on some occasions and in some settings rather than al-
ways unleashing the full power of the state.
Third, conversely, when every organ of our regulatory structure is
imbued with the full authority of the state, those citizens and institu-
tions subject to that authority must be constitutionally entitled to the
well-established panoply of protections that our democracy has long
insured to check state authority.
A. Losing the Benefits of True Self-Regulation
If financial SROs fully transform themselves entirely into govern-
mental organs, then self-regulation in those spheres will be rendered
extinct.  Any gains that governmental financial authority brings will,
therefore, be offset by corresponding and potentially greater losses
from the elimination of one of the financial industry’s oldest tools.  As
lessons from biodiversity, drug-resistant diseases, and one-party rule
teach, systems as complex and multivariate as the U.S. economy rarely
benefit from a reduction in their diversity.  One size almost never fits
all, so caution should accompany any elimination of additional poten-
tial methods of control. If more governmental control of our financial
system is desirable, the devices are already in place—through existing
regulatory agencies—to ratchet up that control.  By converting struc-
tures that were not designed to operate as governmental actors, the
unique attributes of those SROs that enrich the overall compliance
landscape will be jettisoned.  Indeed, the creation and preservation of
SROs itself bespeak faith in their virtues.  There are good reasons why
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SROs were originally given their jurisdiction, and they should be con-
sidered at a time when SROs may be facing termination by
transformation.
Perhaps, however, one might contend that SROs have always
been a compromise and that any creation of an SRO necessarily con-
stituted a concession to overweening industry power.  Self-regulation,
in such a view, is in fact the absence of any regulation and is evidence
that the particular industry successfully rebuffed any oversight of its
activities.257  One would, in essence, be arguing that all financial oper-
ations ought to be overseen by entirely governmental regulatory agen-
cies and that anything other than such oversight is an impotent
alternative secured through political power and impure motives.
The compelling affirmative attributes of self-regulation must
therefore be considered because these attributes will be abandoned in
a bailiwick patrolled by only governmental or quasi-governmental au-
thorities.258  As a first principle, self-regulation evokes the rich tradi-
tion of order without (or with minimal) law, explored and extolled in
the work of Robert Ellickson and Lisa Bernstein.  We explore several
of those benefits here.
1. Industry Expertise
Perhaps the greatest single benefit that self-regulation possesses
over other forms of regulation is its access to direct industry exper-
tise.259  By capitalizing on the participation of industry players, a finan-
cial SRO can enjoy a greater degree of information and experience
regarding the way in which financial transactions are actually per-
formed in today’s incredibly sophisticated and specialized econ-
omy.260  Governmental actors, on the contrary, may be so far removed
257 See BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ORGANI-
ZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 25 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/
2011/967study.pdf (“The most fundamental critique is that self-regulation is not real regu-
lation at all: at best, self-regulation is less effective than government regulation, and at
worst, is merely ‘an illusion’ meant to deflect calls for government oversight.”).
258 Omarova, Wall Street, supra note 18, at 419 (arguing that a successful self-regulatory R
regime, in working to prevent systemic risk, will “ ‘embed’ financial practices in broader
social values and regulatory principles” by making market participants “more explicitly re-
sponsible for the economic and societal effects of [their] activities”).
259 NORMAN S. POSER & JAMES A. FANTO, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND REGULATION
§ 4.01[A] (4th ed. 2007); see also BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., supra note 257, at 24 (citing R
proximity to the industry as a basis for expertise).
260 Park, supra note 41, at 136 (“Because rules generally target misconduct that tends R
to be repeated in similar ways over time, enforcers can build a reservoir of knowledge and
practical expertise that improves their likelihood of prevailing in litigation when enforcing
the rule.” (footnote omitted)).
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from day-to-day operations in this industry that their knowledge of fi-
nancial practices may be either too theoretical or too outdated.261
Indeed, one of the chief criticisms that emerged from
postmortems of the 2008 financial crisis was the fact that governmen-
tal regulators were woefully ill equipped to understand—let alone to
monitor and to regulate effectively—the complicated financial machi-
nations involved in, for instance, synthetic collateralized debt obliga-
tions.262  By more readily drawing upon the expertise, experience,
and information of the regulated, SROs can reduce false-positive and
false-negative error costs and thereby reduce dead-weight losses from
erroneous punishment.
At some level of our overall system, we must be able to gather
information on how finance is actually practiced in our global econ-
omy.  By converting SROs into something else, we risk losing one of
our only links to this reality and becoming even more ignorant of the
state of the art in financial engineering.263
2. Trust Between the Regulating and Regulated
As any prosecutor knows, it is far easier to negotiate with and to
monitor the actions of parties who share a degree of trust.  When an
SRO’s membership and leadership truly represents industry partici-
pants, that trust will be a natural outgrowth of the familiarity the par-
ticipants have with one another.264  The members of a community are
likely to have greater trust of each other on specific issues than does
the general polity at large.  This trust will lead to greater common
ground on issues such as the efficiency and justice of particular rules,
therefore resulting in less disagreement or deviation from expected
behavior.265
Where local compliance is possible without compulsion, the costs
of governance are reduced.  Conversely, when an entity charged with
regulating and enforcing rules is staffed with people who report to the
261 “Enforcement responsibilities were assigned to unspecialized attorneys working for
state officials as disparate as the railroad commission or the state auditor.  When political
administrations changed, responsibility for blue sky enforcement frequently also was reas-
signed.” SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 46. R
262 BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., supra note 257, at 59–60 (stating that knowledge of mar- R
ket technologies is a basic necessity for SEC staff).
263 Even under the Howey test, determining whether a product is a “security” is a fact-
specific inquiry. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
264 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 598
(2012).
265 At an extreme level of trust between the regulated and regulator, SEC employees
may well be subject to “cultural capture,” which academics define as the occurrence of the
regulator becoming socialized to industry concerns and aspirations and carrying that per-
spective into their regulatory tasks. See POGO STUDY, supra note 37, at 31–33. R
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nation’s political capital, the distance between the regulator and the
regulated grows quickly.266
3. Efficient Enforcement
With expertise and trust naturally comes efficiency and savings in
the cost of operations.267  When regulators know more about how a
system actually works, they will be less inclined to waste resources edu-
cating themselves or making errors in regulation.268  Similarly, if the
regulated parties have faith in those who regulate them, they may
be less inclined to challenge the process at every turn, to mount
full-throated defenses, or to expend vast resources in checking the
actions of the authorities.269  SROs, then, are well understood to po-
lice a far broader swath of activities at a comparably much lower cost.
Similarly, private law is less costly to create and to enforce in
many situations.  Almost by definition, the members of a smaller com-
munity, such as a particular industry or even an individual firm, are
likely to share a greater alignment of interests and to be more homo-
geneous along the dimension in which private law acts.270
4. Regulatory Subsidiarity
The values of benefits such as these are often considered in the
design of large political systems, such as the European Union and the
Catholic Church, and have long been celebrated through the theory
of subsidiarity.  That theory posits that power should devolve to the
lowest institution that is competent to exercise it.271  Through such a
federalist process, authority is kept as close as possible to the constitu-
ency that is being governed.
266 Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker, supra note 6, at 1594 (stating that the SEC is R
often criticized for being inward looking and unconstrained by market forces).
267 For example, FINRA is funded primarily through member fees—it is not funded
through taxpayer dollars like the SEC or subject to budgetary constraints by Congress. See,
e.g., FINRA 2011 YEAR IN REVIEW AND ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 9–11, available at http://
www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/documents/corporate/
p127312.pdf.
268 The SEC’s turnover rate, at a high of 13.7% in 2000, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 28 (2004), down to 6.4% in 2011, has been a
focus of the agency as a waste of resources, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 86 (2011).
269 In contrast, the SEC is criticized as an ineffective regulator because of bureaucratic
entrenchment. See, e.g., Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy, supra note 6, at 530; Richard R
B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193,
1298 (1982) (stating that public enforcement suffers from diseconomies of scale).
270 Omarova, Wall Street, supra note 18, at 446 (“The members of an effective commu- R
nity of fate internalize the notion that the failure of any one of them to comply with collec-
tively established rules will have severe consequences for the rest of the industry.”).
271 See generally Aure´lian Portuese, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic
Efficiency, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231 (2011) (arguing that that the principle of subsidiarity
encompasses the principle of economic efficiency).
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Private laws, whether they are designed for a family, a firm, or an
industry, can be tailored by knowledgeable regulators to meet the par-
ticular local circumstances.272  Government rules, by contrast, more
typically embody a one-size-fits-all nature and therefore have the po-
tential to be overinclusive, underinclusive, or both.  For instance, a
rule requiring boards of directors to be a particular size or bedtime to
be a certain hour might be optimal on average but deviate wildly from
optimality in the majority of actual applications.  Private law imposed
via subsidiarity may permit greater opportunity for individual firms or
families to achieve their best local arrangements in ways that improve
the total social welfare.  Sometimes, these rules might be broader than
governmental law, as in university rules prohibiting various forms of
hate speech, and sometimes narrower, as in private associations that
advocate certain types of religious or political viewpoints unpermitted
in government settings.  This tailoring principle is essentially the theo-
retical underpinning of federalism.  But, government can only be so
narrowly tailored, given the costs of creating and deploying govern-
mental decision making.273
B. Losing the Commensurability of Regulation
Comprehensive mosaics of interlocking oversight are richest
when they most effectively calibrate their enforcement to the relevant
infractions.  In our political system, we typically prefer traffic wardens
to issue parking tickets, SWAT teams to resolve hostile domestic scena-
rios, and the military to defend our national interests abroad.  Our
multilayered system of democracy would suffer gravely from the de-
ployment of armed forces to enforce the minor ordinances that gov-
ern our quotidian activities.
Similarly, SROs that are truly self-regulatory can enrich the web
of financial regulation by operating as the constables on patrol, carry-
ing relatively minor tools to handle lesser infractions with lower
stakes.274  Their elimination jeopardizes the ability to oversee minor
272 For example, FINRA enforcement staff exercise a degree of discretion in issuing
either informal or formal action on respondents.  This further engenders a trust relation-
ship between the regulator and regulated as discussed above.
273 For instance, the optimal speed limit likely differs by driver, but this is (currently)
deemed too costly, so local authorities set speed limits by road section, subject to federal
oversight and to prosecutorial discretion vested in the highway patrol.
274 FINRA sanctions are designed to be remedial in nature and proportional to the
severity of the violation.  Toward this end, the FINRA Sanction Guidelines provide that
“[a]djudicators should design sanctions that are significant enough to prevent and discour-
age future misconduct by a respondent, to deter others from engaging in similar miscon-
duct, and to modify and improve business practices.”  FINRA, SANCTION GUIDELINES 1–2
(2011), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@enf/@sg/documents/indus
try/p011038.pdf.  Further, mitigating factors (e.g., taking full responsibility) may also
lessen imposed sanctions. Id. at 3.
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financial infractions with an appropriately commensurate response.  If
the only possible reaction to a financial transgression is the full force
of the federal government or its quasi-governmental equivalent, we
should expect unfortunate consequences.
First, such an overreaction obviously risks alienating the governed
from their governors.  Citizens—or financial firms in the case of finan-
cial SROs—will quickly lose confidence in the judgment of a system
that cannot discriminate between major and minor problems.275  To
the extent that participation in SROs is voluntary—if not technically
then culturally—rational members of SROs will withdraw to the maxi-
mum extent possible from such an out-of-touch enforcement system.
If even the most minor of compliance errors can escalate into federal
enforcement actions, then financial firms will be hard pressed to treat
their SROs as anything other than prosecutors who must be repelled
with the maximum legal protections available.
Second, if financial firms are forced into a defensive crouch and to
don legal armor for every compliance issue, then the costs to regula-
tion are likely to increase.276  In such a hostile dynamic, there will be
no such thing as informal enforcement.  Just as mobilizing the mili-
tary to enforce speeding tickets would consume vastly more resources
than the occasion warrants, turning every opportunity for financial
compliance into a battle between federal regulators and private law
firms will also require greater resources.  Of course, if greater re-
sources are used, then fewer compliance matters can be addressed for
the same budget, resulting in the ultimate undesired consequences:
increasing the governmentalization of regulatory organizations could
lead to a material decrease in regulatory oversight.
Another irony that might flow from the full governmentalization
of SROs could be the subsequent realization that true self-regulation
allowed for broader and more efficient regulation.  Thus, in the fu-
ture, our system would attempt to reinvent what it had in the past: an
industry-based partnership to monitor low-level compliance issues.
But, of course, establishing trust in a new self-regulatory system follow-
ing a wave of governmentalization would come with substantial cost
and effort.
C. The Need for Mandatory Constitutional Protections
Academic commentators and courts have already noted that the
phenomenon of increasing governmentalization of SROs is creating
275 Fear of liability may cause firms to overinvest in precautionary measures or cause
intermediaries to charge more for their services.  Rose, supra note 27, at 2184. R
276 Overdeterrence may cause firms to reduce disclosure of truthful information or
disclose too much information, similarly upsetting the allocative efficiency of the economy.
Id.
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constitutional problems in the regulatory state.  As SROs increasingly
wield the power of the federal government, so too must they be re-
strained by constitutional checks on their authority.277  That is, if
members of SROs may be deprived of liberty by an organization that is
acting under the color of governmental power, then they must also be
protected by the constitutional mechanisms that ensure liberty in our
political system.278  Maintaining this constitutional balance as SROs
grow evermore governmental will require modifying our jurispru-
dence and, simultaneously, also add to the costs of this modified sys-
tem of regulation.279
Scholars such as Roberta Karmel have noted that FINRA’s “in-
creasing government-like functions and operations raise the question
of what checks and balances and due process procedures are neces-
sary for such an SRO to have constitutional law accountability and ad-
ministrative law legitimacy.”280  Although there has been some dispute
about what functions of SROs may constitute government-like activity,
there is broad consensus that any activities that are government-like
do in fact trigger the need for constitutional protections.
Perhaps the threshold constitutional issue that arises from SROs
transmogrifying into governmental entities is the consequence that
277 Common issues with the SRO model include determining whether the SRO is a
state actor, lack of transparency and accountability, inconsistent enforcement authority,
and inherent conflicts of interest (such as executive hiring and compensation).  As a QGO,
constitutional challenges often refer to these issues. See Steven Irwin et al., Self-Regulation of
the American Retail Securities Markets—An Oxymoron for What Is Best for Investors?, 14 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 1055, 1067–79 (2012).
278 Karmel, supra note 18, at 185 (“[S]ince the SROs ‘exercise government R
power . . . by imposing a disciplinary sanction, broadly defined, on a member or person
affiliated with a member . . . [they] must be required to conform their activities to funda-
mental standards of due process.’” (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting S.
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1975, S. REP.
NO. 94-75, at 24–25 (1975))).  For a recent discussion on the constitutional concerns of the
PCAOB as a government controlled regulatory entity, see Harold J. Krent, Federal Power,
Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425,
2440 (2011) (suggesting that after Free Enterprise Fund, congressional delegations to private
entities such as FINRA may be permissible only if the government could review determina-
tions before they become final).
279 Another example would be the PCAOB, which under Sarbanes-Oxley requires
accounting firms to register with the Board and comply with its regulatory standards.
That the U.S. Supreme Court focused on formal presidential control over an inferior
executive-branch entity should raise constitutional concerns for similar congressional dele-
gations to private entities. See Krent, supra note 278, at 2426.  In his article, Professor Har- R
old Krent differentiates delegations to state entities from private entities in that the
Constitution anticipates congressional sharing of power more with state entities, that state
entities are accountable to the electorate, and that state entities are less prone to congres-
sional aggrandizement. Id. at 2441.  Certainly, with the increasing degree of governmental-
ization of private entities, delegating to entities such as the PCAOB, FINRA, and CFTC
diminishes accountability and transparency of a democratic system without commensura-
bly reducing the authority to regulate.
280 Karmel, supra note 18, at 154. R
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such SROs might enjoy immunity from suit.  Indeed, Karmel con-
cludes that “it would appear that FINRA will not have too much diffi-
culty claiming immunity for its activities which would appear to be
primarily, if not entirely, adjudicatory, prosecutorial or regulatory.”281
Obviously, that sort of immunity would greatly alter the relationship
between the organization and its members, very much to the latter’s
detriment.
But, on the member’s side of the ledger, they might increasingly
be entitled to Fifth Amendment pleas in response to SRO requests for
documentary or testamentary evidence.282  Naturally, the reticence of
members to cooperate with SRO investigations will hamper investiga-
tions of wrongdoing.283
To the extent SROs are governmental entities, the targets of their
enforcement actions would also enjoy due process rights that could
prove counterproductive to the SROs.284  If every entity subject to
FINRA oversight were entitled to the full panoply of rights to notice,
to statements of the charges against them, to full representation by
counsel, to appeal, and so forth, then the costs of operating in this
mode will increase for SROs.  Indeed, Karmel concludes that such de-
velopments “would probably ossify the work of the SROs, and would
not necessarily be useful.”285
Of course, the transformation to governmental status does not
affect only the regulated but also the regulator.  SROs that become
true government agencies must themselves abide by the arcane and
bountiful regulations that govern such entities.  That is, they would
need to abide by regulations that constrain the ways in which they hire
personnel, compensate their employees, and conduct their operations
because of the applicability of laws such as the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act and the Administrative Procedure Act.286  In short, SROs can-
not indulge themselves of the attractive aspects of greater power over
281 Id. at 177.
282 The question of whether FINRA or another SRO is a state actor is depicted in
FINRA Rule 8210, which requires respondents to provide materials requested during a
FINRA examination.  When the respondent is also the subject of a criminal proceeding,
however, FINRA Rule 8210 still applies, and the respondent often does not receive the
right to invoke Fifth Amendment protections. See Irwin et al., supra note 277, at 1067–70 R
(discussion and cases on the state-actor issue).
283 See, e.g., Rouse, Exchange Act Release No. 32,658, 54 SEC Docket 1259, 1993 WL
276149, at *5 (July 19, 1993) (“Delay and neglect on the part of members and their associ-
ated persons [in cooperating with investigations] undermine the ability of the NASD to
conduct investigations and thereby protect the public interest.”).
284 Another advantage of SROs is increased flexibility and quicker response time to
address violations or issues in the market.  Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending
Securities Industry Self-Regulation as We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1373 (2005).
285 Karmel, supra note 18, at 186. R
286 Cf. Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy, supra note 6, at 529–31 (discussing the R
attributes that contribute to regulatory inefficiencies of the SEC).
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their subjects without themselves becoming entangled in the web of
chains that keep us free.
D. FINRA Rule 2010: An Example
The most powerful and most commonly invoked FINRA rule is
also perhaps the most vague.  Rule 2010 provides simply: “A member,
in the conduct of its business, shall observe high standards of commer-
cial honor and just and equitable principles of trade.”287  Every viola-
tion of any other FINRA rule is almost by definition also a violation of
Rule 2010, which raises the question of why the rule exists.288  One
practical answer is that the rule operates to capture conduct that can-
not be efficiently or easily proved to violate another rule but that
FINRA believes is worthy of sanction.289
Rules have necessary elements (such as intent or scienter290 or
the existence of a particular fact) that require proof, and FINRA rules
are subjected to legal constraints by the SEC and federal courts.  Ac-
cordingly, if FINRA alleges a broker engaged in manipulation of se-
curities prices or illegal “churning” of a client’s account, FINRA must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that all the elements of
manipulation or churning are satisfied.  This prosecutorial burden is
disciplined by the fact that any member can appeal a FINRA adjudica-
tory outcome to the SEC, then to the federal courts, and even to the
Supreme Court.
Proving all the elements of other rules, such as those proscribing
manipulation, is costly and may be difficult in the brokerage context
because of the ambiguity between desirable, legal conduct and unde-
sirable, illegal conduct.  Manipulation is a good example: although it
is a widespread belief that brokers are capable of manipulating prices
and that their doing so would be a bad thing for investors, drawing
the line between manipulation and more benign trading is exceed-
ingly difficult.  Courts have struggled to develop workable definitions,
and academics have wondered whether any precise definitions are
287 FINRA Rules, supra note 179, R. 2010. R
288 See Kirlin Sec., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 61135, 2009 SEC LEXIS 4168, at
*59–60 n.81 (Dec. 10, 2009) (“It is well established that a violation of a Commission or
NASD rule or regulation is inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade, and is
therefore also a violation of Rule 2110.”).
289 For discussion of Rule 2010 violations not related to securities activities, see Ialeggio
v. SEC, No. 98-70854, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 10362, at *4–5 (9th Cir. May 20, 1999); Vail v.
SEC, 101 F.3d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1996); Jefferson Pilot Sec. Corp. v. Blankenship, 257 F. Supp. 2d
962, 967–68 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Kobey, Exchange Act Release No. 31630, 1992 SEC LEXIS
3313, at *7–8 (Dec. 22, 1992).
290 Scienter is not necessary to prove Rule 2010 violations. See, e.g., DiFrancesco, Ex-
change Act Release No. 66113, 2012 SEC LEXIS 54, at *9 ( Jan. 6, 2012).
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possible.291  But FINRA members charged with overseeing the disci-
pline of other FINRA members possess an informed experience,
which allows them to identify acceptable and unacceptable trading be-
havior at a more impressionistic level.  Proving manipulation may be
difficult, but brokers can fairly easily distinguish between good and
bad broker behavior in a particular case.292
In such cases, Rule 2010 demonstrates its prosecutorial appeal.
The rule allows members appointed to discipline other members to
levy penalties against brokers who engage in socially undesirable con-
duct that might otherwise be too difficult or costly to prove violates
other more specific rules.  A general, ethical rule like this is especially
important because brokers with knowledge of other specific rules can
use the specifics as a roadmap to facilitate evasion.293  In other words,
the vagueness of Rule 2010 is its power, in that it lowers monitoring
and enforcement costs and provides a broad net to catch bad brokers
who would escape punishment in a more formalistic environment.
Importantly, a vague, ethical rule like Rule 2010 may be pecu-
liarly within the power of a SRO to use.  To tolerate the use of such a
powerful and ill-defined rule, members must have faith that the dis-
cretion it grants to those sitting in judgment will be exercised wisely.
Behind the veil of ignorance, self-regulated brokers might be more
likely to agree to be bound by such a rule than if the discretion were
to be exercised by nonindustry members, such as government agents.
Reciprocity might potentially constrain abuse, and brokers might have
greater faith in the expertise of industry members.  Whatever the rea-
sons, the loss of a powerful ethical rule would increase monitoring,
enforcement, and adjudication costs, as well as the possibility of
greater social losses in the event that more undesirable conduct will
occur.
William Douglas made a similar point in his famous speech to the
Hartford Bond Club noted above.  As Douglas described it, some un-
desirable conduct is “too minute for satisfactory [government] con-
trol,” and some unethical conduct lies “beyond the periphery of the
law,” such that it can be reached only by self-regulation.294  Rule 2010
is an example of this kind of powerful, extralegal rule, the absence of
291 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in
Financial Markets?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 503, 506 (1991).
292 The best analogy here is Justice Stewart’s definition of obscenity—“I know it when I
see it”—in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  The prob-
lem with such vague definitions in specialized areas is that their application by generalist
judges may produce uncertainty in the minds of primary market participants, which results
in increased costs.
293 For a discussion on the scope of a rule violation, see Department of Enforcement v.
Shvarts, Complaint No. CAF980029, 2000 WL 768524, at *3–5 (N.A.S.D.R. June 2, 2000).
294 SELIGMAN, supra note 11, at 186 (internal quotation marks omitted). R
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which might undermine the efficient enforcement of broker
behavior.
IV
ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR SROS
If the increasing governmentalization of SROs is a problem, then
what possible means might be deployed to halt or to reverse the un-
welcome progress of this mutation?  At least three different ap-
proaches might be worth considering: directly overturning regulatory
interventions, indirectly addressing the mechanisms that have led to
those regulatory interventions, and cultivating new mechanisms that
may tend to produce more independent and self-regulatory SROs.
A. Reversing the Series of Regulatory Interventions
First, one might attempt to reinstate the “self” in self-regulatory
organizations simply by imposing independence by fiat.  That is, the
Congress or the relevant administrative agencies could, respectively,
enact legislation or promulgate regulation that insulates financial
SROs from governmental oversight.  In essence, this step would in-
volve repealing those incremental measures adopted (and set forth in
Part II above) over the past few decades that have most decisively pul-
led SROs into the governmental orbit.  So, for instance, the composi-
tion of SRO governing boards could be revised to allow a greater
representation of the industries themselves.295  Similarly, the mecha-
nisms by which agencies currently approve or disapprove of regula-
tions and enforcement actions of SROs could be formally severed.
While this approach is direct and would likely achieve the most
immediate de-governmentalization of SROs, it suffers for ignoring the
cause and effect of the changes in SROs.  As we have shown in this
Article, a variety of mechanisms has evolved to generate the increasing
governmentalization of SROs—any attempt to alter the product of
those mechanisms could simply be reversed once again by the inexo-
rable workings of those mechanisms in future.
If the political will is not available for these direct measures, as
our survey of the mechanisms producing greater governmentalization
suggests, then a deeper approach will be necessary.296
295 In the past, the SEC has attempted to infuse boards with “independent directors,”
but the effect was to federalize corporate governance.  The opposite may also be true
where changing the composition to separate directors from any affiliation with the SEC
may also lead towards degovernmentalization. See Karmel, supra note 250, at 121–23. R
296 Professor Steven Schwarcz, in response to Saule Omarova’s Wall Street as Community
of Fate, supra note 18, recommends several tactics for improving self-regulation: creating a R
systemic risk fund to motivate self monitoring and standardizing financial products to
make products more cognizable to prospective investors, thereby managing risk.  Steven L.
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B. Halting the Mechanisms of Governmentalization
A second approach, therefore, would be to attempt to effect
change at the level of the particular mechanisms that we have de-
scribed in Part III of this Article.  Of course, this technique would re-
quire a broad variety of efforts, put forth in some unknowable
combination, in order to achieve a satisfying result.
Certain mechanisms, of course, may simply be beyond any regula-
tory remedy.  The increasingly individualistic nature of investors in
the financial markets together with their increasing exposure to
greater losses, for instance, are profound changes being driven by
massive paradigm shifts in our retirement system.297  As employers,
both public and private, adopt defined contribution plans in the place
of defined benefit plans, we will continue to see fewer professionally
managed pension plans and greater numbers of individually managed
retirement accounts.  A few prototypes have recently emerged, how-
ever, that might reverse this development.  In one such example, retir-
ees in California are voluntarily enrolling in private plans that mimic
the organizational structure of pension plans—that is, participants
can combine their private accounts into a greater plan, managed by
professionals, to take advantage of economies of scale and exper-
tise.298  To the extent these pilot programs expand, they could reduce
the direct exposure of individuals to loss and thereby reduce the
need—or perceived need—for greater governmental control over fi-
nancial regulation.
The one-way ratchet mechanisms are extremely difficult to
counteract inasmuch as they appear to be driven by psychological
heuristics and biases that give greater attention and weight to failures
than to successes.  Since those failures are almost always more salient
to investors, the media, and governmental authorities, it will be diffi-
cult to prevent authorities from overreacting to them.  Of course,
these sorts of overreactions are common across the law, whether it be
shark bites, terrorist attacks, or disease outbreaks: authorities regularly
have their cost-benefit analyses challenged by rare but dramatic
events.  One measure that can be deployed to counter these effects is,
however modest, to draw attention to them.  A great deal of recent
psychological literature attempts to counter deleterious financial deci-
Schwarcz, Response, Financial Industry Self-Regulation: Aspiration and Reality, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 293, 293–301 (2011).
297 See, e.g., Debra A. Davis, Do-It-Yourself Retirement: Allowing Employees to Direct the Invest-
ment of Their Retirement Savings, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 353, 354–65 (2006).
298 See ROSS EISENBREY & MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POLICY INST., CALIFORNIA RETIRE-
MENT PLAN COULD SERVE AS A NATIONAL MODEL 1–2 (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.epi.org/
publication/pm193-california-retirement-plan-national-model/.
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sions primarily by alerting people to those choices in the hope that
greater awareness will dampen those effects.
To the extent that individual regulators or entire compliance in-
dustries appear to be arrogating power to themselves by promoting
more governmental regulation, certain steps can be taken.  First,
prohibitions on the revolving door between industry and regulation
attempt to address this process at the individual level.299  Perhaps dis-
closure measures can be introduced to compute the additional num-
ber of compliance professionals that any new regulations will require.
Publicizing this number might draw attention to the ways in which
increasingly governmental regulation benefits the compliance
industry.
C. Cultivating Regulatory Competition
A third approach would be to try to foster a market solution to
the problem.  If the number of SROs operating in any particular fi-
nancial sector could be increased, then the dynamics of competition
might work to produce something closer to an optimal blend of “self”
in self-regulatory organizations.300  If any one SRO were to grow too
governmental for the tastes of its constituency, then that organization
would lose market share and thereby be disciplined into altering its
approach.301  Competition, of course, requires more than one SRO in
any given field.  Unfortunately, the costs of establishing SROs are high
and, indeed, possibly prohibitive without governmental subsidy.  Ac-
cording to a report by Boston Consulting Group, the start-up costs of
creating a new SRO might be as high as $300 million.302  Indeed, the
investment advisory industry is currently resisting the creation of an
SRO in some part because of the financial burden such a new institu-
tion would impose upon their firms.  Similarly, there might be high
switching costs to members that would prohibit free movement from
one SRO to another, and such movement would be vital to imposing
market discipline upon each SRO.  Finally, there might be a dearth of
299 See POGO STUDY, supra note 37, at 37–38; Langevoort, The SEC as a Lawmaker, supra R
note 6, at 1604; see also Tom McGinty, Staffer One Day, Opponent the Next, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, R
2010, at C1, (criticizing the revolving door between the SEC and industry).
300 Coffee, supra note 249, at 470–73. R
301 Prior to Dodd-Frank, credit default swaps were largely traded without regulation.
For regulating the credit default swap market, Professor Kristin Johnson argues that Con-
gress and regulators typically employ three different models of governance: a deregulatory
governance model where parties do not have formal or informal rights and where no third
party is involved in the ordering of the market; privatization where market access is ex-
pressly afforded to some parties and not others; and lastly, coercion by an external, central
regulatory authority.  Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 101, 175 (2011).
302 BOSTON CONSULTING GRP., supra note 209. R
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expertise available to staff and managers of multiple financial SROs
across the economy.
If there is value to regulatory competition, then it might be worth
revisiting the approval of the merger of the NYSE and NASD regula-
tory arms to create FINRA.303  Efficiency reasons, such as having a sin-
gle set of rules or a single enforcer, justified the merger, and these are
likely real and significant justifications.304  But there is an offsetting
cost to the consolidation that might have been underappreciated at
the time.  If we are correct that FINRA is becoming increasingly gov-
ernmental in its regulatory approach, and if the costs of this change
cannot be checked by an alternative source of regulatory oversight,
then we can be less confident in the efficiency of the regulatory
model.  If a regulator becomes inefficient, for whatever reason, and
the regulated have the choice to switch regulators, this provides a
check on regulatory overreach (this is a race-to-the-top story of regula-
tory competition, which is not the only possibility).  We cannot be
confident that the problem we have identified in this Article would be
sufficient to warrant undoing the creation of FINRA, and we are cer-
tain the political will to do so now is lacking.  But if the governmental-
ization of FINRA continues and some change is necessary, going back
to multiple broker SROs might be an option worth considering.
The impediments to increasing competition amongst SROs do-
mestically, however, do not necessarily rule out all possible sources of
competition.  As we have seen in other financial areas, international
markets are a broader source of regulatory arbitrage.305  If a greater
303 As an example, a consolidation between the CFTC and SEC has been discussed for
many years, particularly during the financial meltdown in 2008, when the House Commit-
tee on Financial Services held a hearing entitled Regulatory Restructuring and Reform of the
Financial System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. (2008).  The possibil-
ity of consolidation sparked a competition between the SEC and the CFTC to remain rele-
vant with the belief that market forces may sort the problem out; however, this regulatory
competition arguably leads to a race to the bottom, and academics such as Roberta Karmel
believe the competition was extremely unproductive and resulted in the widespread use of
unregulated, over-the-counter derivatives.  Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of the Securities and
Exchange Commission as a Market Regulator, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 501, 513–14 (2009).  At the
same time, Karmel strongly believes that a consolidation of the two entities would ulti-
mately lead to better regulation. Id. at 533–35.
304 For example, certain groups representing investment advisers recommend that
FINRA serve as the SRO for investment advisers because of the preexisting relationship
and regulatory framework. See The Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R.
4264 Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 8–9 (2012) (statement of Dale Brown,
President and CEO, Financial Services Institute).
305 See Bart Chilton, Comm’r, Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, Address Before
the Goldman Sachs Global Commodity Conference: Stopping Stammering: Overcoming
Obstacles in Financial Regulatory Reform (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.cftc.gov/press
room/speechestestimony/opachilton-43.html (addressing a potential “race to the bottom”
absent international harmonization of rules regulating the massive global derivatives
market).
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array of SROs is desired but unaffordable within the United States,
then Congress and the financial administrative agencies should per-
mit financial firms to choose amongst international SROs.  As finan-
cial markets grow in size and sophistication in Asia and Europe, they
might produce additional regulatory—and self-regulatory—institu-
tions that might carry some of the burden of regulating U.S. entities.
Of course, U.S. authorities would first have to agree to accede to the
authority of those foreign institutions.  We hope to have provided
some rationales for reclaiming greater self-regulation of our financial
markets, wherever that self-regulation can be found.
There is also the possibility for some competition domestically.
There is a growing phenomenon of securities being traded in
so-called dark pools.  Dark pools are private trading platforms for in-
stitutional investors, and they now account for about 15% of all stock
trades in U.S. markets.306  One could easily imagine these dark pools
becoming rival trading locales that compete in part on the quantity
and quality of regulation.  There is some evidence that this is the case.
As noted above, one of the mechanisms driving increasing govern-
mentalization is the type of potential victim.  If dark pools are popu-
lated entirely with sophisticated institutional investors, then a more
pure form of self-regulation would be appropriate and unobjec-
tionable.  The new equilibrium could therefore be a world in which
quasi-governmental regulation (or even just governmental regulation)
was used for retail securities markets and self-regulation was used for
institutional securities markets.  We leave it for another day to put the
flesh on the bones of this idea, but we should note that this potential
separating equilibrium is already coming under strain.  Worries about
systemic risk and arbitrage between the markets have already led
FINRA to “expand[ ] its oversight of the dark-trading venues.”307  Al-
though such oversight might be warranted, we tentatively believe that
it would be superior for FINRA to do it under a separate regulatory
apparatus that could resist the governmentalization that is driving the
self out of self-regulation in general.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have attempted to enrich the academic focus
upon self-regulation in the U.S. financial markets.  Notwithstanding
the enormous degree of academic output following the recent finan-
cial scandals and crises, relatively little of that work has focused upon
the actual first point of contact between financial firms and regula-
tors: self-regulatory organizations.  Traditionally, Congress and the fi-
306 See Scott Patterson, Vow of New Light for ‘Dark’ Trades, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2013, at C3.
307 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-1\CRN101.txt unknown Seq: 69  1-NOV-13 7:02
2013] BECOMING A FIFTH BRANCH 69
nancial agencies receive the greatest attention despite the reality that
self-regulatory organizations are the primary constables on patrol in
this field.
Much of the scholarship on self-regulation that does exist, how-
ever, acknowledges that SROs have, along certain axes, adopted nota-
bly governmental traits.  That scholarship tends to consider the
constitutional implications of such a development without examining
why it is occurring.  We have attempted to rectify that oversight by
examining why the process of governmentalization may be occurring
and what it is costing us.  Without understanding the mechanisms that
are driving governmentalization, we will have a difficult time address-
ing or reversing the process.  Our primary purpose, therefore, has
been to explore those processes in an effort to enrich our understand-
ing of a phenomenon that is vital to any effort to regulate our finan-
cial system effectively.
We have proposed some possible approaches to reverse the pro-
cess of governmentalization in SROs, directly, indirectly, and through
the use of countervailing market forces, but devising true solutions
will be the charge of future scholarship.
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